Motivational processes and performance:  the role of global and facet personality traits by Martin, James Haven
Louisiana State University
LSU Digital Commons
LSU Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School
2002
Motivational processes and performance: the role
of global and facet personality traits
James Haven Martin
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, jhmarti@lsu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations
Part of the Psychology Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
LSU Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contactgradetd@lsu.edu.
Recommended Citation






MOTIVATIONAL PROCESSES AND PERFORMANCE: 










Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the  
Louisiana State University and 
Agricultural and Mechanical College 
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of  








James Haven Martin 
B.A., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1997 






 I would like to express my sincerest appreciation to my committee chair, Dr. Jim 
Diefendorff, and to committee members Dr. Irv Lane, Dr. Jerel Slaughter, Dr. Robert 





















TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS……………………………………………………….………ii 
 
LIST OF TABLES……………………………………………………………………...iv 
 





 Study Overview………………………………………………..…………….…..1 
 Personality and Performance…………………………………..…………….…..3 
 Conscientiousness……………………………………………..…………………6 
 Neuroticism…………………………………………………..………………….9 
 Self-efficacy, Goals, and Performance……………………..…………………..12 
 Personality, Self-efficacy, Goals, and Performance………..…………………..16 






 Analytic Strategy….……………………………………………………………38 
 
RESULTS………………………………………………………………………………43 
 Descriptive Statistics…………………………………………………...………43 
 Tests of Hypotheses…………………………………………………………….48 
 Tests of Time 1 Models…………………………...……………………………52 
 Tests of Time 2 Models………………………………………………………...63 
 
DISCUSSION…………………………………………………………………………..73 
 Summary of Findings…...……………………………………………………...73 
 The Role of Personality in the Motivation/Performance Link…………………82 
 Global vs. Facet Prediction of Motivation and Performance…………………..85 
 Personality and Changes in Self-Efficacy and Goals…………………………..86 





APPENDIX A: GOAL AND SELF-EFFICACY QUESTIONNAIRE………………101 
 




LIST OF TABLES 
 
1.  Reliabilities (Coefficient Alpha) for Global Factors and Facets: 
Form S of the NEO-PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 1991)…………………................35 
 
2.  Descriptive Statistic s, Reliability Coefficients, and Correlation Coefficients: 
Conscientiousness and Facets………………………………………………….44 
 
3.   Descriptive Statistics, Reliability Coefficients, and Correlation Coefficients: 
Neuroticism and Facets………………………………………………………...46 
 
4.  Fit Indices for Covariance Structural Analyses:  
Social Cognitive Theory Constructs……………………………………………49 
 
5.  Fit Indices for Covariance Structural Analysis:  
Conscientiousness Facet Models (Time 1)……………………………………..55 
 






























LIST OF FIGURES 
 
1.  Hypothesized Relationships between Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, Self-Efficacy,   
Goal Level, Ability, and Performance………………………………………….19 
 
2.  Hypothesized Relationships between Facets of Conscientiousness, Self-Efficacy,  
 Goal Level, and Performance…………………………………………………..22 
 
3.   Hypothesized Relationships between Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and Changes  
 in Self-Efficacy (Goals) from Time 1 to Time 2………………………………24 
 
4.    Hypothesized Rela tionships between Achievement-striving, Self-discipline, and  
 Changes in Self-Efficacy (Goals) from Time 1 to Time 2…………………….25 
 
5.   Hypothesized Relationships between Facets of Neuroticism, Ability, Self-Efficacy,  
 Goal Level, and Performance…………………………………………………..30 
 
6.  Hypothesized Relationships between Anxiety, Vulnerability, Depression, and  
 Changes in Self-Efficacy (Goals) from Time 1 to Time 2……………………..32 
 
7.  Standardized Path Model for Ability, Self-Efficacy, Goal, and Performance……...51 
 
8.  Standardized Path Model for Global Conscientiousness, Ability, Self-Efficacy, Goal, 
and Performance (Model 2; Time 1)…………………………………………..53 
 
9.  Standardized Path Model for Facets of Conscientiousness, Ability, Self-Efficacy,  
 Goal, and Performance (Time 1)……………………………………………….57  
 
10.   Standardized Path Model for Global Neuroticism, Ability, Self-Efficacy, Goal, and  
 Performance (Time 1)………………………………………………………….61 
 
11.  Standardized Path Model for Facets of Neuroticism, Ability, Self-Efficacy, Goal,  
 and Performance (Time 1)……………………………………………………..62 
 
12.  Standardized Path Model for Global Conscientiousness, Time 1 Self-Efficacy,  
 Time 1 Goals, Performance, Time 2 Self-efficacy, and Time 2 Goals………..65 
 
13.  Standardized Path Model for Achievement-striving, Self-discipline, Time 1 Self- 
 Efficacy, Performance, and Time 2 Self-Efficacy……………………………..67 
 
14.   Standardized Path model for Achievement-striving, Self-discipline, Time 1 Goal, 
Performance, and Time 2 Goal…………………………………………………68 
 
15.   Standardized Path Model for Global Neuroticism, Time 1 Self-Efficacy, Time 1 
 Goals, Performance, Time 2 Self-Efficacy, and Time 2 Goals……………….70 
 
vi 
16.  Standardized Path Model for Anxiety, Depression, Vulnerability, Time 1 Self- 
 Efficacy, Performance, and Time 2 Self-Efficacy……………………………71 
 
17.   Standardized Path Model for Anxiety, Depression, Vulnerability, Time 1 Goal,  
























 The conscientiousness and neuroticism dimensions of the Five Factor Model 
(FFM) have been shown to be predictive of performance (Barrick & Mount, 1991; 
Paunonen & Ashton, 2001).  This research examined three relatively unexplored issues, 
including (a) the impact of conscientiousness and neuroticism on motivational processes 
and performance; (b) the criterion-related validity of facet measures of 
conscientiousness and neuroticism as predictors of motivation and performance; and (c) 
whether conscientiousness, neuroticism, and their facets impact changes in motivational 
processes between performance episodes.   
 Undergraduate psychology students (N = 220) completed measures of self-set 
goals and self-efficacy beliefs on two occasions, prior to the first and second 
examinations of the Fall semester in 2001.  Separate testing sessions were conducted in 
which the participants completed a personality inventory and a cognitive ability test.  
Structural equation modeling was used to test all hypotheses.  Results indicated that 
both conscientiousness and neuroticism predicted motivational processes and also 
accounted for unique variance in performance, with conscientiousness having stronger 
effects than neuroticism.  Additionally, results provided evidence for the usefulness of 
facet- level operationalizations of personality constructs (e.g., achievement-striving, 
competence, and anxiety) as predictors of motivation and performance compared with 
global measures.  Finally, changes in self-efficacy beliefs were predicted by 
conscientiousness-related constructs, but not by neuroticism-related constructs.  
Personality factors had no impact on goal revision.  Implications and recommendations 
for future research in the personality and motivation domains are discussed. 
 
1 
INTRODUCTION Study Overview 
Over the past ten years abundant research has shown that individual differences 
in personality are important predictors of performance.  Recent meta-analytic studies 
(Barrick & Mount, 1991; Barrick, Mount, & Judge, 1999; Hurtz & Donovan, 2000; 
Salgado, 1997) have consistently reported significant relationships between axes of the 
Five Factor Model (FFM) of personality and important work behaviors, with 
conscientiousness and neuroticism having the strongest effects.  It has been proposed 
(Kanfer, 1990) that personality traits do not impact performance directly, but through 
more proximal constructs such as situationally specific self-efficacy (Bandura, 1997) 
and goals (Locke & Latham, 1990).  Accordingly, a challenge faced by current 
researchers is to delineate more precisely the relationships between the personality, 
motivation, and performance domains (Austin & Klein, 1996).  To date, most of the 
empirical work addressing this issue has focused on the conscientiousness dimension of 
the FFM; several studies have shown that goals and/or self-efficacy either partially or 
fully mediate the conscientiousness/performance relationship (Barrick, Mount, & 
Strauss, 1993; Gellatly, 1996;  Martocchio & Judge, 1997).  Less is understood about 
the effects of neuroticism on motivation and performance (Judge, Erez, & Bono, 1998) 
although some research suggests a negative neuroticism/motivation relationship 
(Ahrens, Zeiss, & Kanfer, 1988).  The first contribution of the present investigation was 
to explore the personality-motivation-performance relationships in greater depth, using 
measures of both conscientiousness and neuroticism. 
Although conscientiousness, like the other dimensions of the FFM, is a higher 
level composite of several first-order traits (Paunonen, 1998), there has been little 
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investigation of the discriminant validity of these facet traits as predictors of motivation 
or performance (Hough, 1997).  In recent years, a growing body of scholars have 
argued that the criterion-related validity of personality testing can be enhanced when 
personality is operationalized at the facet, rather than the global level (Hurtz & 
Donovan, 2000; Paunonen, 1998; Schneider, Hough, & Dunnette, 1996).  The second 
contribution of this research was to examine the unique relationships of the facets of 
conscientiousness and neuroticism with motivation and performance.  Theoretical 
linkages between personality facets and motivational constructs will be detailed in a 
later section.   
It is commonly accepted that the relationship between task-specific motivation 
and performance is dynamic and reciprocally causal (Bandura, 1997; Carver & Scheier, 
1998; Locke & Latham, 1990).  That is, not only does motivation impact performance, 
but performance impacts subsequent motivation (Locke & Latham, 1990; Phillips, 
Hollenbeck, & Ilgen, 1996).  Generally speaking, high performance will lead to 
sustained or increased motivation and low performance will result in decreased 
motivation.  However, this set of relationships has proven to be very complex (Campion 
& Lord, 1982; Phillips et al., 1996; Vancouver, Thompson, & Williams, 2001); at times, 
individuals do not conform to these rules very closely.  A tenet of the present 
investigation is that changes in motivation (increases or decreases) can be predicted by 
personality after controlling for the effects of performance.  Thus, a third purpose of this 
study is to evaluate the effects of conscientiousness, neuroticism, and their facets on 
changes in motivational variables (i.e., goals and self-efficacy) over time.  The 
following sections of the paper will discuss and review recent empirical findings 
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concerning the personality/performance relationship, the structures of conscientiousness 
and neuroticism, self-efficacy and goals, and the motivation-performance cycle.  
Personality and Performance 
Early reviews of the personality/job performance relationship (Guion & Gottier, 
1965; Schmitt, Gooding, Noe, & Kirsch, 1984) yielded relatively weak validity 
coefficients.  One of the shortcomings of the research in this period was the lack of a 
unifying theoretical framework of personality around which findings could be 
organized.  The emergence of the Five-Factor Model (FFM; Digman, 1990) as the 
dominant model of personality in the 1990’s allowed a more systematic cumulation of 
findings than had been possible previously.  The FFM postulates that the uppermost 
level of the personality hierarchy is comprised of five orthogonal factors: 
conscientiousness, neuroticism, extraversion, agreeableness, and openness to 
experience.   
Two of the FFM factors, conscientiousness and emotional stability (i.e., 
neuroticism) have shown the strongest relationships with job performance (ρ = .23 and 
ρ  = .12, respectively), as reported in a second-order meta-analysis by Barrick, Mount, 
and Judge (1999).  The relationship between job performance and conscientiousness has 
been particularly well established, beginning with the seminal Barrick and Mount 
(1991) meta-analysis.  Notably, it has also been shown (Day & Silverman, 1989) that 
the conscientiousness/job performance relationship is unrelated to the 
ability/performance relationship; ability is conceptualized as a “can-do” construct, 
whereas conscientiousness is thought to affect performance through motivational, “will-
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do” processes (Barrick, Mount, & Strauss, 1993; Borman, White, Pulakos, & Oppler, 
1991).   
Less is understood about the role motivational processes play in the relationship 
between neuroticism and job performance.  Barrick et al. (1999) concluded that 
neuroticism affects individuals’ sense of well-being at work and susceptibility to stress.  
Neurotic individuals experience physical and emotional distress caused by prolonged 
negative moods and adverse reactions to unpleasant events in their lives (Suls, Green, & 
Hills, 1998).  Clearly, these outcomes are likely to have negative implications for job 
performance, including absenteeism and difficulties with interpersonal relationships.  It 
is possible that the same neuroticism-related symptoms (e.g., stress, negative 
affectivity) have important effects upon individuals’ motivational thoughts and 
behaviors; however, with few exceptions (e.g., Ahrens, Zeiss, & Kanfer, 1988) this 
issue has not received much empirical attention. 
It might be supposed, based on the reading of the meta-analytic studies of the 
past ten years (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Barrick et al., 1999; Ones, Schmidt, & 
Viswesvaran, 1993;  Salgado, 1997; Tett, Jackson, & Rothstein, 1991) that personality’s 
relevance for prediction of job performance can be adequately modeled at the level of 
the FFM.  For example, conscientiousness, like general mental ability, has been 
proposed as a universal predictor of job performance across all occupations (Mount & 
Barrick, 1995; Ones & Viswesvaran, 1996; Salgado, 1997).  According to these authors, 
breaking conscientiousness down into its constituent facets is not a practical strategy for 
enhancing the predictive validity of this construct for job performance.  Ones and 
Viswesvaran (1996) use a two-pronged argument to support this position.  First, the 
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bandwidth-fidelity distinction (Cronbach & Gleser, 1957) suggests that a broad 
construct (i.e., conscientiousness) is a more suitable predictor of a complex criterion 
(job performance) than narrower predictor constructs.  According to this logic, whereas 
a subtrait of conscientiousness (e.g., dutifulness) may be useful for predicting a 
particular job behavior (punctuality), it is better to use the global construct for 
predicting overall performance.  Second, narrow persona lity constructs typically are 
measured with lower reliability than broad constructs; to ensure equivalent levels of 
reliability for narrow constructs would require extremely long personality inventories, 
which managers of organizations are not likely to endorse.   
Recently, however, an increasing number of writers (Ashton, Jackson, 
Paunonen, Helmes, & Rothstein, 1995; Hough & Schneider, 1996; Kanfer & Ackerman, 
2000; Paunonen & Ashton, 2001; Schneider, Hough, & Dunnette, 1996; Stewart, 1999) 
have argued tha t the global FFM dimensions are too broad to predict important job 
performance behaviors.  Part of the rationale for this argument is that, contrary to Ones 
and Viswesvaran’s position, job performance is not a unitary, complex construct.  
Rather, it is a multifaceted construct with a complex latent structure (Campbell, 
McCloy, Oppler, & Sager, 1993; Hough, 2001).  Consequently, aggregation of 
personality facets into global dimensions results in the loss of specific variance that may 
be valuable in the prediction of performance (Paunonen, 1998).  Paunonen and Ashton 
(2001) suggested that aggregation of facet traits into global categories can actually 
reduce personality/performance correlations when some of the facets are negatively 
correlated with performance and others are positively correlated with performance.   
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Whether personality facets predict job performance better than global measures 
is an empirical issue that has just begun to attract researchers’ attention.  Contrary to 
Ones and Viswesvaran’s (1996) position, recent studies have shown that facet measures 
of personality can account for more variance in performance, including sales volume 
(Stewart, 1999) and academic performance (Paunonen & Ashton, 2001), than global 
measures.  However, examination of the predictive validity of personality facets has 
received surprisingly little empirical testing (Hough, 1997). 
Conscientiousness  
Although there continues to be controversy over the correct labeling of the 
global categories of the FFM (John, 1990), there appears to be general consensus 
regarding their broad interpretation.  Like the other global dimensions of the FFM, 
conscientiousness is a complex construct that resists unitary definition.  Most theorists 
(e.g., Digman, 1990; Hough, 1997) conceptualize conscientiousness broadly as a 
bidimensional construct, representing individual differences in dependability and 
achievement orientation.  Thus, employees can be conscientious by virtue of being 
dependable (e.g., punctual, well-organized, loyal), oriented toward achievement (e.g., 
driven to succeed, ambitious), or both.  It is not surprising that conscientiousness is 
more highly correlated with job performance than any other FFM factor; however, the 
fact that these two dimensions are included in the same general construct has led to 
criticisms of the FFM taxonomy.  For example, Hough (1997) suggests that grouping 
achievement and dependability under a common personality construct diminishes both 
the criterion-related and construct validity of each.  Investigators can avoid such 
potential confounds by measuring conscientiousness at the facet level.    
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The FFM originally emerged from factor analytic studies of trait terms occurring 
in natural language (Digman, 1996); as such, each of the five factors can be regarded as 
an aggregation of lower- level traits.  Conscientiousness is operationalized as a 
composite of six facets in Costa and McCrae’s (1992) NEO-PI-R personality inventory 
(competence, order, dutifulness, deliberation, self-discipline, and achievement-striving).  
These facets fall roughly into the two broad dimensions of conscientiousness described 
above (Hough, 1997).  The first five facets reflect the “dependability” aspect of 
conscientiousness; achievement-striving represents the ambition side of 
conscientiousness.  Sample items from the scales are given below to illustrate their 
general content. 
The competence scale (e.g., “I pride myself on my sound judgment”) measures 
individuals’ perceptions of their overall capability, sensibility and prudence.  Competent 
people are generally self-confident and high in internal locus of control (Costa, McCrae, 
& Dye, 1991).  High scorers on the order scale (e.g., “I keep my belongings neat and 
clean”) are methodical and well-organized.  They see themselves as thorough and 
efficient at task performance.  The deliberation scale contains items that are oriented 
toward caution (e.g., “I always consider the consequences before I take action”).  
Highly deliberate individuals avoid hasty, impulsive decisions; one potential 
shortcoming of such individuals may be a lack of spontaneity.  Finally, the dutifulness 
scale is intended to tap the respondent’s adherence to ethical principles, or conscience 
(e.g., “I’d really have to be sick before I’d miss a day’s work”).  High scorers see 
themselves as scrupulous in fulfilling their moral obligations.  
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The other two facets of the conscientiousness dimension are more volitional in 
character.  Volition, or will, concerns the initiation and maintenance of actions related 
to goal attainment (Locke & Latham, 1990); additionally, task perseverance and 
determination at overcoming obstacles are in part a function of volition (Heckhausen, 
1991).  Stewart (1999) suggests that the achievement-striving scale (e.g., “I have a clear 
set of goals and work toward them in an orderly fashion”) taps volitional processes.  
High scorers on this scale are diligent and purposeful; such individuals tend to be highly 
ambitious and goal driven.  Similarly, the self-discipline scale measures the 
respondent’s determination to bring tasks to completion (e.g., “Once I start a project, I 
almost always finish it”).  Highly self-disciplined individuals avoid procrastination, and 
have the capability of resisting boredom and distractions. 
Empirical evidence supports Hough’s (1997) contention that facet measures of 
conscientiousness are more predictive of performance than global measures.  Stewart 
(1999) reported that, whereas global conscientiousness predicted sales performance 
uniformly, facets of conscientiousness accounted for incremental variance in 
performance (sales volume) dependent upon employee tenure.  Specifically, the order 
subtrait was related to sales volume for newly hired employees; the achievement-
striving subtrait was related to sales volume for longer-term employees.  According to 
Stewart (1999), order is important for new, or “transition” employees (Murphy, 1989) 
because methodical planning and effective time management are particularly critical at 
this stage.  Conversely, achievement-striving becomes more important for longer-term 
(“maintenance”; Murphy, 1989) employees, because work at this later stage requires 
less structured planning and more goal commitment and persistence.   
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More recently, Moon (2001) used a decision-making task to test criterion-related 
validities for facet- level traits (dutifulness and achievement-striving) versus global 
conscientiousness.  The criterion was escalation of commitment to a task with a sunk-
cost component.  Whereas dutifulness was negatively related to escalation of 
commitment, achievement was positively related to the criterion.  The global 
conscientiousness dimension, by contrast, was unrelated to escalation of commitment, 
showing that the subtraits of conscientiousness accounted for more variance in 
commitment than did the global construct. Thus, Stewart (1999) and Moon (2001) have 
demonstrated that analysis of personality at the facet level can reveal important 
information that may be obscured at the global level.     
In an academic setting, Paunonen and Ashton (2001) found that the 
achievement-striving  facet was more highly correlated with undergraduate’s final 
grades than a composite measure of conscientiousness.  Paunonen and Nicol (2001) 
reported that the self-discipline facet had a significantly higher correlation with 
undergraduate grade point average than did global conscientiousness, accounting for an 
additional 7.7% of the criterion variance.  Paunonen’s studies supplement the 
theoretical writings of Hough and the empirical work of Stewart (1999) and Moon 
(2001), suggesting that there is practical value in analyzing conscientiousness at the 
facet level. 
Neuroticism  
To Freud, Jung, Horney, and other early personality theorists, neuroticism was 
the trait construct of predominant interest (Hogan & Roberts, 2001).  The negative 
relationship between neuroticism and job performance is probably attributable to the 
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tendency of neurotic individuals to experience psychological and physical distress, 
including depressive and anxiety-related symptoms (Barrick et al., 1999).  Neurotic 
individuals are also less tolerant of stress, higher in negative affectivity, and lower in 
self-esteem (Costa & McCrae, 1992).  It has been shown that such tendencies are 
related to counter-productive work behaviors, including disciplinary problems (Hough, 
Eaton, Dunnette, Kamp, & McCloy, 1990) and procrastination (Beswick & Mann, 
1994).    
Interestingly, although neuroticism is second only to conscientiousness as a 
predictor of job performance (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Hurst & Donovan, 2000; 
Salgado, 1997), there has been no systematic research on the criterion-related validities 
of the individual subtraits of neuroticism.  The facets of neuroticism in the NEO-PI-R 
(Costa & McCrae, 1992) are anxiety, depression, angry hostility, self-consciousness, 
impulsiveness, and vulnerability.  
Individuals high in depression (e.g., “Too often, when things go wrong, I get 
discouraged and feel like giving up”) exhibit chronic negative affect, low energy, and 
hopelessness.  They tend to be lower in self-esteem, and to set lower goals (Ahrens, 
Zeiss, & Kanfer, 1988; Hollenbeck & Brief, 1987).  The major implication of 
depression for work-related behaviors is employee withdrawal, usually manifested as 
low job commitment or high emotional distress (Lowman, 1996).   
Conversely, anxiety is an energized state (Carver & Scheier, 1998); high scorers 
(e.g., “I often feel tense or jittery”) tend to dwell inordinately on feared outcomes, and 
to suffer from nervous tension.  Additionally, they are more susceptible to phobias, 
generalized anxiety, and compulsive disorders.  Vulnerability is a measure of a person’s 
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ability to handle stressful situations (e.g., “I can handle myself pretty well in a crisis”).  
Highly vulnerable individuals show a propensity for panic or hopelessness when under 
pressure.  High-anxiety and vulnerable employees are susceptible to performance 
decrements caused by excessive stress and worry (Matthews, Schwean, Campbell, 
Saklofske, & Mohammed, 2000).  Anxiety is also related to low self-efficacy regarding 
academic performance (Smith, Arnkoff, & Wright, 1990) and training performance 
(Martocchio, 1994).  
The angry hostility scale (e.g., “I often get angry at the way people treat me”) 
measures individuals’ susceptibility to frustration and anger.  High scorers tend to be 
touchy and irritable, handling even moderately provoking situations with difficulty.  
People with high self-consciousness scores (e.g., “In dealing with other people, I always 
dread making a social blunder”) are uncomfortable around others.  Their shyness makes 
them particularly sensitive to ridicule.  The impulsiveness scale taps the individual’s 
ability to resist temptation (e.g., “I sometimes eat myself sick”).  Additionally, such 
individuals show low tolerance for frustration, and a predisposition for negative mood 
states.  In this respect the NEO-PI-R differs from other FFM measures, in which 
impulsiveness is indicative of spontaneity, a facet of (low) conscientiousness (e.g., the 
Personality Research Form; Jackson, 1984).    
In sum, although global neuroticism predicts job performance, it is possible that, 
similar to conscientiousness, individual subtraits impact performance to varying degrees 
and for different reasons.  For example, it is probable that individuals high in depression 
underperform others in part because of motivational difficulties (e.g., low personal 
performance standards).  In contrast, individuals scoring high on the anxiety, 
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impulsiveness, or vulnerability subscales may perform poorly due to the negative mood 
states and the distracting effects of worry over potential failure in evaluative situations 
(e.g., test performance; Bossong, 1994).  The hostility and self-consciousness subtraits 
may not impact task performance directly, but may have important effects on 
performance in interpersonal contexts.    
Self-Efficacy, Goals, and Performance 
 A basic premise of the proposed study is that personality affects performance 
largely through its effects on motivation.  The motivation/performance model used here 
is derived from Bandura (1997; Wood & Bandura, 1989) and Locke and Latham 
(1990).  According to these authors, self-efficacy and goal level are the most proximal 
predictors of performance.  The level of performance in turn impacts subsequent self-
efficacy evaluations and goal choices.  This model has proven to be extremely robust 
empirically (Locke & Latham, 1990), with several studies supporting these links (Chen, 
Gully, Whiteman, & Kilcullen, 2000; Phillips & Gully, 1997; Thomas & Mathieu, 
1994).  For example, studies in academic settings have consistently shown that self-
efficacy is positively correlated with self-set goal level and that both self-efficacy and 
goal level have independent relationships with performance in coursework (Klein, 
1991; Mone, 1994; Phillips & Gully, 1997; Thomas & Mathieu, 1994).   
According to social cognitive theory (SCT), self-efficacy (a belief in personal 
capability to perform at a given level on a specific task) is one of the most important 
determinants of performance.  Bandura (1991; 1997) considers self-efficacy to be task-
specific, although some research has provided evidence for a generalized self-efficacy 
construct (Chen et al., 2000).  As an evaluation of task-specific capabilities, a critical 
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component of self-efficacy is the individual’s belief that he or she can perform the 
subtasks required for successful overall performance.  Thus, according to SCT, 
individuals’ beliefs regarding their abilities relative to situational features are critical 
determinants of performance.  The primary source of such evaluations is past 
experience (i.e., “enactive mastery”; Gist, 1987), although self-efficacy can also be 
enhanced through role models, verbal persuasion, or self-monitoring of physiological 
states (Bandura, 1997).  Research has shown that stable individual differences, 
including causal attributions (Thomas & Mathieu, 1994) and goal orientation (Phillips 
& Gully, 1997) are also important antecedents of self-efficacy beliefs.  Self-efficacy is 
similar to the expectancy construct (perceived probability of success at a task given a 
certain level of effort), but it is broader in scope, stemming from individuals’ beliefs in 
their overall level of competence (Wood & Locke, 1987).  
A large body of research (Bandura, 1997) has shown that self-efficacy is 
positively related to performance.  In a meta-analysis across 114 studies, Stajkovic and 
Luthans (1998) report a weighted average correlation of r = .38 between self-efficacy 
and work-related performance.  Studies have shown that self-efficacy impacts 
performance through goals, and also independently of goals (e.g., Chen et al., 2000; 
Phillips & Gully, 1997).   
Few relationships in the organizational behavior literature have been as 
extensively explored as that between goals and task performance (Locke & Latham, 
1990).   Experimental studies have consistently shown a positive linear relationship 
between goal difficulty and task performance, which only levels off when participants 
reach their maximal ability levels (Mento, Steel, & Karren, 1978; Tubbs, 1986; Wood, 
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Mento, & Locke, 1987).  According to Locke and Latham (1990), difficult goals 
engender greater direction of attention and strategy generation than easy goals.  It has 
also been shown repeatedly that specific goals are more conducive to high performance 
than vague (“do your best”) goals (Mento et al., 1978; Tubbs, 1986).  Specific goals are 
effective because they provide individuals with clearer performance standards than 
general goals (Klein, 1989).  
Locke, Shaw, Saari, & Latham (1981) proposed that self-set goals may be more 
effective than assigned goals for detecting the effects of individual differences on goals 
and related constructs.  Individual differences are expected to be reflected in goal 
selection, because people do not typically choose goals they feel unwilling or unable to 
achieve.  Several researchers in recent years have used self-set goal designs to explore 
the relationships between motivation, performance, and individual difference 
constructs, including need for achievement (Phillips & Gully, 1997), generalized self-
efficacy (Chen et al., 2000), and conscientiousness (Barrick et al., 1993).  Hollenbeck 
and Brief (1987) showed that individual differences predict self-set goal level, such that 
individuals with high task-specific self-efficacy set higher goals than others.   
Consistent with previous research (e.g., Chen et al., 2000; Phillips & Gully, 
1997), the present investigation hypothesized that self-efficacy will be positively related 
to goal level, goal level would be positively related to performance, and goals would 
partially mediate the relationship between self-efficacy and performance.  Additionally, 
because cognitive ability has been shown to be an important determinant of self-
efficacy (Chen et al., 2000; Phillips & Gully, 1997) and task performance (Hunter & 
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Hunter, 1984), it was expected to be positively related to these variables in the present 
investigation.   
Hypothesis 1: There will be a positive relationship between self-efficacy and 
goal level. 
Hypothesis 2: There will be a positive relationship between goal level and 
performance. 
Hypothesis 3: Goal level will partially mediate the relationship between self-
efficacy and performance. 
Hypothesis 4: There will be a positive relationship between ability and 
performance. 
Hypothesis 5: There will be a positive relationship between ability and self-
efficacy.    
Single-occasion tests of the impact of motivation on performance give an 
incomplete picture of the relationships between these constructs, as task performance 
tends to impact subsequent self-efficacy beliefs and goals.  For example, according to 
goal-setting theory, individuals who experience success in previous endeavors have a 
greater belief in their abilities (self-efficacy), and hence set higher performance goals, in 
an upward spiral (Locke & Latham, 1990; Phillips, Hollenbeck, & Ilgen, 1996).  At the 
end of each performance cycle, individuals compare their actual performance levels 
with their goals or standards.  Depending on the outcome of this comparison, 
individuals either maintain their goals (no revision), abandon their goals (downward 
revision), or raise their goals (upward revision) (Phillips et al., 1996).  According to 
SCT, successful performance usually results in upward revision, and unsuccessful 
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performance leads to downward revision.  It is less clear when no revision will occur 
(Phillips et al., 1996).  In short, SCT suggests that changes in goals and self-efficacy 
from Time 1 to Time 2 are largely a function of performance at Time 1.  
In a recent empirical study, Thomas and Mathieu (1994) made a distinction 
between “within-episode” and “between-episode” processes  to characterize the 
dynamic relationships between motivation and performance.  Within-episode processes 
concern the relationships between individua l differences, self-efficacy, goals, and 
performance.  Between-episode processes refer to changes in self-efficacy and goals 
from Time 1 to Time 2.  Thomas and Mathieu (1994) examined the impact of goal 
achievement and causal attributions on changes in self-efficacy for academic test 
performance.  They found that individual differences (i.e., stable, internally caused 
performance attributions) impacted changes in self-efficacy.  The present study adopts 
Thomas and Mathieu’s (1994) terminology, and examines the role of personality in 
predicting within and between episode motivational processes. 
Personality, Self-Efficacy, Goals, and Performance 
The present investigation examines the relationships between personality, self-
efficacy, goals, and performance.  Three possibilities are explored.  First, in terms of 
within-episode processes, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and their facets are 
hypothesized to predict initial levels of self-efficacy, goals, and performance.  Second, 
the effects of personality on perfo rmance are expected to be partially mediated by self-
efficacy and goals.  Third, in terms of between-episode processes, it is hypothesized that 
conscientiousness, neuroticism, and their facets will predict changes in self-efficacy and 
goal level after controlling for performance.   
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As discussed above, ample empirical evidence exists suggesting that 
conscientiousness is an important predictor of performance.  Of course, validity 
coefficients do not address the question of how conscientiousness affects performance.  
Researchers have suggested that the primary mechanisms behind the conscientiousness/ 
erformance relationship are motivational.  Studies have shown that conscientious 
individuals set higher goals (Barrick, Mount, & Strauss, 1993) and report higher levels 
of self-efficacy for a wide variety of tasks (Colquitt & Simmering, 1998; Gellatly, 1996; 
Martocchio & Judge, 1997).  One issue of interest to researchers has been the extent to 
which self-efficacy and goals mediate the relationship between conscientiousness and 
performance.  Partial mediation was reported by Barrick et al. (1993), who found that 
conscientiousness affected sales performance when the effects of goals were controlled.  
Similarly, in a study in which grade goals were assigned to undergraduate participants 
in a management seminar, Colquitt and Simmering (1998) reported that 
conscientiousness accounted for incremental variance in learning when the effects of 
expectancy were controlled.  Conversely, self-efficacy (and self-deception) fully 
mediated the conscientiousness-performance relationship in Martocchio and Judge 
(1997) in which the criterion involved learning a software task.  Gellatly (1996), using 
performance on a simple calculating task as the criterion, found that the effect of 
conscientiousness on goals was fully mediated by expectancy.  
 In sum, while self-efficacy, goals, and related constructs mediate the 
relationship between conscientiousness and performance, there is uncertainty with 
respect to the extent of the mediation.  A potential reason for expecting partial 
mediation is that some facets of conscientiousness may be related directly to 
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performance, whereas other facets affect motivational processes, which in turn impact 
performance.  Alternatively, the relationships between the individual facets of 
conscientiousness and performance may themselves be partially mediated by self-
efficacy and goals.  For example, although conscientious individuals typically set higher 
goals than others (because of achievement orientation), they also have greater volitional 
capabilities (e.g., persistence, thoroughness) that may not be reflected in their 
motivational self-assessments.  If either contingency is true, using a global 
conscientiousness measure should result in self-efficacy and goals partially mediating 
the conscientiousness-performance link.  Based on this logic and previous research 
(Barrick et al., 1993; Colquitt & Simmering, 1998), the present investigation 
hypothesized that conscientiousness would have some effect on performance 
independent of goals and self-efficacy (Figure 1).  
Hypothesis 6: The path between conscientiousness and performance will be 
partially mediated by self-efficacy and goal level. 
Surprisingly, there have been no studies examining the links between the various 
facets of conscientiousness and motivational processes, although prediction of 
performance has been shown to be enhanced by measurement of conscientiousness at 
the facet level (Paunonen & Ashton, 2001; Paunonen & Nicol, 2001; Stewart, 1999).  
Because conscientiousness is posited to affect performance largely through motivational 
processes (Mount & Barrick, 1995), one of the objectives of this investigation was to 
systematically investigate the relative contributions of the facets of conscientiousness in 
predicting self-efficacy, goals, performance, and changes in these variables over time.  
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Figure 1:  Hypothesized Relationships between Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, Self-
Efficacy, Goal Level, Ability, and Performance.  Note: Dotted lines indicate partial 















extension of earlier studies which have shown that self-efficacy and goals mediate the 
effects of conscientiousness on performance (Barrick et al., 1993; Colquitt & 
Simmering, 1998; Gellatly, 1996; Martocchio & Judge, 1997).   
The present study hypothesized that the facets of conscientiousness would 
differentially impact self-efficacy and goals to influence performance.  It was proposed 
that five of the subtraits (i.e., order, dutifulness, deliberation,  competence, and self-
discipline) would be related to  performance through individuals’ self-efficacy beliefs.  
Specifically, because order, dutifulness, deliberation, caution, and self-discipline should 
be positively associated with behaviors related to academic effectiveness, it was 
predicted that individuals high in these qualities would also express high self-efficacy 
beliefs.  Individuals high in competence and dutifulness are generally self-confident and 
responsible; it was expected that the personality-performance link for these two 
subtraits will be fully mediated by self-efficacy.  However, because qualities related to 
deliberation, order, and self-discipline are valuable for actual task implementation (e.g., 
caution, thoroughness, and concentration), it was expected that self-efficacy would 
partially mediate the relationships between these facets on performance.  
Achievement-striving, an indicator of individuals’ ambition and goal 
directedness, was expected to affect performance chiefly through goals.  High scorers 
on the achievement-striving subscale are driven to succeed (Costa & McCrae, 1992).  In 
a study of the effects of individual differences on motivational processes, Phillips and 
Gully (1997) reported a significant correlation between need for achievement and goals 
(r = .19, p < .01), but a weaker relationship between need for achievement and self-
efficacy (r = .06, n.s.).  Thus, it appears likely that the achievement-striving facet 
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impacts performance predominately through goals.  However, a direct link between the 
achievement-striving subtrait and performance was also predicted, because task 
performance should be positively impacted by effortful processes associated with 
achievement-striving but not related to goal choice.  During performance, individuals 
high in achievement-striving were expected to exert greater effort to overcome 
unanticipated difficulties, and take greater care to avoid errors, than individuals lower in 
achievement-striving.    
Hypothesis 7: The relationships between the competence and dutifulness facets 
and performance will be fully mediated by self-efficacy. 
Hypothesis 8: The relationships between the order, deliberation, and self-
discipline facets and performance will be partially mediated by self-efficacy. 
Hypothesis 9: The relationship between the achievement-striving facet and 
performance will be partially mediated by goal level.  
Conscientiousness and its subtraits were predicted to affect changes in self-
efficacy and goals between performance episodes.  Specifically, conscientiousness was 
expected to account for variance in these motivational constructs at Time 2 when the 
effects of self-efficacy, goals, and performance at Time 1 were controlled.  It was also 
expected that the subtraits of conscientiousness would differentially predict changes in 
self-efficacy evaluations and goals.  Whereas order, dutifulness, competence, and 
deliberation were not expected to be related to changes in self-efficacy or goal level, it 
was anticipated that self-discipline and achievement-striving would explain variance in 
changes in both when previous motivation and performance were controlled.  As 









       
       
 







Figure 2: Hypothesized Relationships between Facets of Conscientiousness, Self-
Efficacy, Goal Level, and Performance.  Note: Dotted lines indicate partial mediation 





















through to completion.  Thus, self-disciplined individuals should show more resilience 
to negative performance feedback, such that their self-efficacy ratings and goals are less 
likely to decrease following sub-standard performance (i.e., when performance is lower 
than previous goal).  Moreover, they should respond to successful performance (i.e., 
when performance exceeds previous goal) with correspondingly higher ratings of self-
efficacy and goals.  When substantial goal-performance discrepancies occur, such that 
performance falls below goals, these individuals are less likely to lower self-efficacy 
beliefs than others.  They should also be more reluctant to abandon their goals when 
they encounter negative performance feedback.  By the same token, when performance 
exceeds goals, individuals high in achievement-striving are apt to raise both self-
efficacy ratings and goals for subsequent performance cycles (cf. Phillips et al., 1996).  
The other four subtraits predictive of self-efficacy (order, dutifulness, competence, and 
deliberation) are primarily associated with planning, self-confidence, and organization; 
hence, they were expected to affect the level of self-efficacy, but not necessarily 
changes in self-efficacy or goals.  See Figures 3 and 4 for a representation of the 
following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 10:  Conscientiousness will explain unique variance in self-efficacy 
at Time 2, controlling for self-efficacy and performance at Time 1.   
Hypothesis 11: Conscientiousness will explain unique variance in goal level at 
Time 2, controlling for goal level and performance at Time 1. 
Hypothesis 12: Self-discipline and achievement-striving will explain unique 
variance in self-efficacy at Time 2, controlling for self-efficacy and performance 
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Figure 3:  Hypothesized Relationships between Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and 
Changes in Self-Efficacy (Goals) from Time 1 to Time 2 (Hypotheses 10, 11, 18, and 
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Figure 4: Hypothesized Relationships between Achievement-striving, Self-discipline, 
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Hypothesis 13: Self-discipline and achievement-striving will explain unique 
variance in goal level at Time 2, controlling for goal level and performance at 
Time 1. 
Clearly, neuroticism is less “motivational” in character than conscientiousness.  
Accordingly, researchers have shown less inclination to include neuroticism in models 
investigating the relationships between personality, motivation and performance.  
However, certain links can be identified in the personality and motivational literatures, 
which are discussed below. 
Recent work by Judge and his colleagues (Judge & Bono, 2001; Judge, Erez, & 
Bono, 1998; Judge, Locke, & Durham, 1997; Judge, Locke, Durham, & Kluger, 1998) 
suggests that neuroticism contributes to individuals’ core self-evaluations, which in turn 
affect their willingness and confidence to perform specific tasks.  These core self-
evaluations have implications for motivation-related decisions.  For example, because 
neurotic individuals are more likely to view difficult tasks negatively (i.e., beyond their 
control to manage), they will tend to experience lower levels of motivation (Watson, 
2000).  Additionally, an individual with a negative self-concept (based on low self-
evaluations) is less apt to increase effort to resolve discrepancies between actual 
performance and performance standards (Judge, Erez, & Bono, 1998).  Evidence for 
such relationships was provided by Hemenover and Dienstbier (1996), who showed that 
neuroticism was negatively related to undergraduates’ perceived ability to perform 
successfully on an upcoming psychology exam.  Specifically, neurotic participants rated 
their own problem-solving capacity lower, and the exam as more stressful, than non-
neurotic participants.  It is beyond the scope of this study to test the implications of 
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Judge’s core self-evaluations theory for motivation.  However, the model suggests that 
neuroticism should be negatively related to goals, self-efficacy, and performance.   
Three of the facets of neuroticism (depression, anxiety, and vulnerability) were 
expected to be related to performance through motivational variables, but three were not 
(angry hostility, self-consciousness, and impulsiveness).  However, impulsiveness was 
predicted to have direct effects on  performance.  For example, individuals high in this 
subtrait may experience difficulty tuning out intrusive thoughts unrelated to task 
performance, which may impair performance.  Therefore, it was expected that self-
efficacy and goals would account for only a portion of neuroticism’s effect on 
performance. 
Hypothesis 14: The effects of neuroticism on performance will be partially 
mediated by self-efficacy and goal level (Figure 1). 
Based on the construct definitions of the subtraits of neuroticism, it is likely that 
some facets should be more strongly related to motivation and performance than others.  
This implies that aggregating the facets of neuroticism into a global trait might tend to 
obscure variance in motivation and performance that a facet level of analysis would 
reveal.  As discussed above, one of the facets of neuroticism is susceptibility to 
depression.  Ahrens, Zeiss, and Kanfer (1988) showed that depressed students set 
significantly lower goals for class performance.  Additionally, depression is negatively 
related to self-esteem (Robins, Hendin, & Trzesniewski, 2001), which has been shown 
to be associated with higher goals (Hollenbeck & Brief, 1987) and greater effort under 
difficult goal conditions (Carroll & Tosi, 1970).  Thus, one of the reasons depression 
may be negatively related to performance is because depressed individuals set lower 
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standards for performance than non-depressives (Locke & Latham, 1990).  
Additionally, negative affect and excessive self- focus can deplete cognitive resources 
and undermine performance in depressive individuals (Markman & Weary, 1998).  
Therefore, the present investigation predicted that the relationship between the 
depression subtrait and performance would be partially mediated by goals.   
The anxiety and vulnerability to stress facets were expected to affect 
performance partly through self-efficacy beliefs.  Because individuals high in trait 
anxiety tend to appraise themselves as lacking capability for dealing with demanding 
situations (Matthews, Derryberry, & Siegle, 2000), these subtraits should negatively 
impact self-efficacy evaluations.  Individuals high in these subtraits tend to engage in 
more severe self-criticism, derived in part from negative self-beliefs (Matthews et al., 
2000).  However, research has also shown that individuals high in anxiety and 
vulnerability experience task-related performance decrements attributable to their 
greater difficulty in maintaining attentional focus (Matthews et al., 2000).  Because 
such effects may not be reflected in self-efficacy evaluations, it is predicted that the 
relationships between the anxiety and vulnerability facets and performance will be 
partially mediated by self-efficacy.  
One of the remaining subtraits of neuroticism, impulsiveness, may have 
implications for performance that would not be reflected in motivational processes.  
Because individuals high in impulsiveness experience difficulty resisting strong internal 
cravings, it was expected that they would be more susceptible to performance- inhibiting 
distractions than individuals low in this attribute.  Impulsiveness, then, was expected to 
be directly related to task performance.  The remaining two neuroticism facets, self-
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consciousness and angry hostility, are associated primarily with  difficulties in 
interpersonal interactions, and were not hypothesized to have any significant 
relationships with the motivational or performance variables in the present study.  The 
following set of hypotheses for neuroticism facets are depicted in Figure 5. 
Hypothesis 15: The relationships between the anxiety and vulnerability facets 
and performance will be partially mediated by self-efficacy. 
Hypothesis 16: The relationship between the depression facet and performance 
will be partially mediated by goal level. 
Hypothesis 17: The impulsiveness facet will be negatively related with 
performance. 
Similar to conscientiousness, neuroticism and its subtraits were also expected to 
be related to between-episode criteria (Thomas & Mathieu, 1994), such that neuroticism 
would predict changes in self-efficacy and goal level independent of performance.  
Anxiety, vulnerability, and depression were expected to be independently related to 
changes in both self-efficacy evaluations and goals.   
Individuals high in anxiety and vulnerability to stress should experience strong 
reactions to performance failure, which could be reflected in subsequent self-efficacy 
ratings.  Because they are more susceptible to self-criticism (Matthews et al., 2000), 
anxious and vulnerable individuals might also be more apt to abandon goals when they 
encounter difficulties.  Depressive individuals are particularly prone to internal, stable 
attributions for performance outcomes (Beck, 1976), making them more likely to 










    H16 
 
 




Figure 5:  Hypothesized Relationships between Facets of Neuroticism, Ability, Self-
Efficacy, Goal Level, and Performance.  Note: Dotted lines indicate partial mediation 





















performance capabilities.  Consequently, lower performance is likely to lead to both 
lower self-efficacy beliefs and downward goal revision for such individuals.  Therefore, 
it was expected that depression will have an independent relationship with changes in 
self-efficacy and goal level when the effects of previous performance and motivation 
are controlled.   
Hypothesis 18:  Neuroticism will explain unique variance in self-efficacy at 
Time 2, controlling for performance and self-efficacy at Time 1 (Figure 3).  
Hypothesis 19: Neuroticism will explain unique variance in goal level at Time 2, 
controlling for performance and goal level at Time 1 (Figure 3). 
Hypothesis 20: Anxiety, vulnerability, and depression will explain unique 
variance in self-efficacy at Time 2, controlling for performance and self-efficacy 
at Time 1 (Figure 6). 
Hypothesis 21: Anxiety, vulnerability, and depression will explain unique 
variance in goal level at Time 2, controlling for performance and goal level at 
Time 1 (Figure 6). 
Overview of Investigation 
The models in Figures 1-6 were tested using undergraduates’ coursework as the 
task.  Participants reported self-efficacy and goals prior to the Time 1 examination.  
After receiving their grades on this exam, they reported self-efficacy and goals for the 
Time 2 exam.  Coursework is an appropriate task for evaluating such motivational 
processes; some of the advantages include repeated performance episodes, the exact 
quantification of performance, the independence of individual performance, and the 
















Figure 6:  Hypothesized Relationships between Anxiety, Vulnerability, Depression, and 

























sessions were held later in the semester, at which participants completed a cognitive 
ability test and personality inventory.  Consistently significant positive relationships 
between conscientiousness and academic performance have been reported in recent 
studies.  Correlations between conscientiousness and undergraduate GPA have ranged 
from r = .17 (Goff & Ackerman, 1992) to r = .34 (Wolfe and Johnson, 1995).  
Conversely, both Goff and Ackerman (1992) and Wolfe and Johnson (1995) report non-
significant relationships between neuroticism and academic performance (r = -.09 and  
r = -.02, respectively).  Possibly, stronger effects for neuroticism would have been 
found if the authors had used facet measures.  
 A repeated measures design was used in the study, to examine changes in self-
efficacy and goals as a function of performance and stable personality traits.  The major 
advantage of repeated measures designs is that they allow within-person analyses of 
changes in self-efficacy and goal level that are not possible with single-occasion, 
between-subject designs (Klein, 1991; Vancouver et al., 2001).  Thus, as discussed 
previously, personality factors may influence the extent to which individuals revise their 
goals, with hard-working (conscientious) participants less inclined to revise goals 
downward following performance failure, and easily discouraged (neurotic) participants 








Participants.   
Data were collected during the Fall 2001 semester.  Data were obtained from 
Louisiana State University psychology undergraduates (N = 220), who participated in 
return for partial course credit.  Participants were recruited from four classes, including 
Introduction to Psychology (n = 30), two Introduction to Statistics classes (n = 85), and 
Personality Psychology (n = 105).  175 of the participants were female, 45 were male; 
185 participants described themselves as White, 19 were African American, five 
Hispanic, nine Asian, and two Other.  The mean age of participants was 21 (sd = 2.66).    
Measures   
 Conscientiousness and neuroticism.  Conscientiousness, neuroticism, and their 
facets were assessed with the NEO-PI-R Form S (self-report; Costa & McCrae, 1992).  
The NEO-PI-R was the first questionnaire-type instrument designed specifically to test 
the five-factor model, and remains the most widely used facet-based FFM personality 
questionnaire (Widiger & Trull, 1997).  It contains 240 self- report items, and usually 
requires 30-40 minutes to complete.   
Conscientiousness and neuroticism are computed as weighted averages of six 
first-order facets.  Each facet is assessed with eight items, which are formulated as self-
descriptive statements.  For example, an item for the achievement striving scale of 
conscientiousness reads, “I have a clear set of goals and work toward them in an orderly 
fashion.”  Responses are given in a 5-point Likert scale, from Strongly Disagree to 
Strongly Agree.  Table 1 shows the global factors, their first-order facets, and the 





Reliabilities (Coefficient Alpha) for Global Factors and Facets, Form S of the NEO-PI-
R (Costa & McCrae, 1992).   
 
Scale       α 
Conscientiousness   .90 
 C1: Competence  .67 
 C2: Order   .66 
 C3: Dutifulness  .62 
 C4: Achievement Striving .67 
 C5: Self-Discipline  .75 
 C6: Deliberation  .71  
Neuroticism    .92 
 N1: Anxiety   .78 
 N2: Angry Hostility  .75 
 N3: Depression  .81 
 N4: Self-Consciousness .68 
 N5: Impulsiveness  .70 
N6: Vulnerability  .77  
______________________________________________________________________ 






The NEO-PI-R has been extensively validated with other personality measures, 
including the Personality Research Form (PRF; Jackson, 1984), Gough’s (1983) 
Adjective Check List, and Goldberg’s (1992) Big Five Markers inventory.  It has also 
been used frequently in organizational settings (Costa, 1996). 
Goals.  Participants indicated their test goals by reporting the minimal grade (in 
percentage points) that would satisfy them (Appendix 1).  Locke and Bryan (1968) 
showed that such goals were more highly correlated with academic performance than 
“hope for” or “will try for” operationalizations.   
Self-efficacy.  A scale developed by Wood and Locke (1987) was employed.  
Self-efficacy was measured with seven items, including class concentration, 
memorization, exam concentration, understanding, explaining concepts, discriminating 
concepts, and note-taking.  Although Wood and Locke (1987) asked participants to 
respond in a yes/no format on two separate dimensions (Can Do and Confidence), 
Maurer and Pierce (1998) showed that a 5-point Likert format along a single dimension 
offered similar reliabilities and validity for academic performance.  The scale performed 
moderately well as a predictor of performance in Wood and Locke (1987), with 
validities ranging from r = .10 (explaining concepts) to r = .26 (class concentration).  
Maurer and Pierce (1998) report an overall validity coefficient of r = .25 for final course 
grades. 
Cognitive ability.  Ability was assessed with the Wonderlic Personnel Inventory, 
a 12-minute test of general mental ability.  This instrument has 50 multiple choice and 
short answer questions; examinees are instructed to answer as many items as possible in 
12 minutes.  The test measures three basic areas of intelligence: Verbal Ability 
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(synonyms and antonyms), Math Ability (word and complex arithmetic problems) and 
Logical Reasoning (syllogisms and sentence completion).  The test begins with 
relatively simple questions, but the degree of difficulty rises quickly, and very few 
respondents are able to answer all 50 items in the 12 minute period.  The WPT comes in 
a simple, three-page format.  The examinee writes answers in boxes in the margins of 
the test form itself.   
Test-retest reliabilities of the WPT range from .82 to .94 (Murphy, 1984).  
Internal consistency estimates (KR-20) are generally around .90.  The WPT correlates 
highly with other, more extensive mental ability tests, including the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale-Revised (WAIS-R), with r = .89 to .96 reported in various studies, 
and the General Aptitude Test Battery (GATB), with r = .56 to .80.  A score of 20 
correct responses on the WPT corresponds approximately to a WAIS-R IQ score of 100 
(Wonderlic Inc., 1992).  
Procedure 
During the last class meeting prior to their first examination, participants in 
three of the classes (Personality and both Statistics sections) reported their goals and 
self-efficacy for performance on the exam.  During the first class meeting after 
receiving their exam scores on the first test, participants reported their goals and self-
efficacy for the second exam.  One point of extra credit was granted to participants for 
each occasion.  Additionally, participants were given the opportunity to register for 
separate 90-minute testing sessions, in which they completed a cognitive ability test and 
a personality inventory.  These sessions were held later in the semester.  Three extra 
credit points were granted for these sessions.  Students in the Introduction to 
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Psychology class were asked to report their goals and self-efficacy for the second 
examination of the semester.  During the separate testing sessions they reported goals 
and self-efficacy for their next exam.    
Responses to all measures were coded and subsequently matched at the end of 
the semester to help ensure confidentiality.  To further guarantee anonymity, all 
identifying information was removed from questionnaire materials after all data were 
matched.  Instructors did not see students’ responses on any of the questionnaires during 
the semester.    
Analytic Strategy 
All hypothesized models were tested using structural equation modeling (SEM) 
with LISREL 8.3 (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1993).  Based on the analysis of covariance 
structures, SEM has distinct advantages over other statistical techniques.  For example, 
unlike regression or ANOVA, SEM permits the researcher to  simultaneously estimate 
relationships between observed and latent constructs and between different latent 
constructs.  Additionally, SEM automatically accounts for measurement error by 
modelling latent constructs separately from observed variables and error terms.    
 The two-step approach.  In testing the hypothesized models, the present 
investigation uses the two step model-building approach recommended by Anderson 
and Gerbing (1988).  With this method, the researcher begins by specifying a 
measurement model, in which the relationships between observed variables and latent 
constructs are analyzed.  This confirmatory factor analysis phase examines whether the 
items or item indicators are valid measures of the hypothesized latent constructs.  
Satisfactory specification of a measurement model is a necessary prerequisite for testing 
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substantive hypotheses.  Step two involves a hypothesis-driven examination of the 
structural relationships between the latent constructs themselves, in which the goal is to 
find the most meaningful and parsimonious model for the observed data.  Various 
criteria (i.e., fit indices) are used to evaluate the adequacy of measurement and 
structural models. 
If the initial theoretical model does not fit observed data, alternative structural 
models can be examined.  Anderson and Gerbing (1988) outline a systematic procedure 
for fitting alternative structural models to observed covariance matrices by applying and 
relaxing constraints (i.e., dropping or adding paths) between latent constructs.  These 
modifications to the structural model should be theory-driven, rather than empirically 
driven.  Models that only differ in the number of constraints applied are said to be 
nested.  The chi-square difference test is used to compare the fit of nested models, with 
the goal of identifying the most appropriate (i.e., best- fitting) model.   
 Item parcelling.  As mentioned above, in the confirmatory factor analysis phase 
of SEM the researcher must provide evidence that the observed study variables are 
related strongly to their hypothesized latent constructs, and not to unrelated constructs.  
At its most basic level, this issue can be examined by testing whe ther individual scale 
items load on the appropriate latent construct.  Using item-level indicators is essential 
when developing a new measure.  However, investigators frequently use an item 
parcelling strategy (combining items from the same scale  into common indicators) 
when using an established measure with many items and multiple constructs.  There are 
two advantages to this strategy.  First, item parcels commonly exhibit higher reliability 
than individual items (West, Finch, & Curran, 1995).  Second, us ing parcels reduces the 
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number of estimated parameters in the measurement model; because model fit estimates 
are more stable when the respondent-to-parameter ratio is high, it is frequently 
preferable to combine indicators into parcels (Hall, Snell, & Fous t, 1999).  For these 
reasons, and because the measures used in this study have been previously validated, 
item parcels were used in the present investigation.  For models testing facet- level 
hypotheses, three item parcels were formed for each personality facet scale (8 items 
each) and both self-efficacy scales (7 items each) (Bollen, 1989).  For models testing 
global- level hypotheses, each personality facet scale mean was used as a separate 
indicator; as before, three item parcels were used for the self-efficacy scales. This 
procedure was used by Judge, Bono, and Locke (2000) in a similar study in which both 
higher-order and lower-order traits were modeled in separate analyses.  
 Single indicator variables.  Three of the variables in the study (cognitive ability, 
goal level, and performance) were represented by single scores; these were defined by 
single indicators.  Because it cannot be assumed that such measures are perfectly 
reliable, a procedure described by Joreskog and Sorbom (1982) was used to estimate 
error variances (theta-delta or theta-epsilon) and factor loadings (lambda) for these 
single indicator variables.  Error variances were fixed at one minus the reliability 
(estimated at .88 for the Wonderlic Personnel Test, and at .90 for the goal level and 
performance items; Phillips & Gully, 1997) multiplied by the observed score variances.  
Factor loadings for these items were fixed as a function of one minus the square root of 
their reliabilities (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988). 
 Evaluation of model fit.  Structural equation modeling software packages give 
the researcher a variety of means for evaluating the fit of observed data to theoretical 
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models.  The most conventional indicator of model fit is the chi-square (χ2) statistic, 
which represents the size of the discrepancy between the sample and model- implied 
covariance matrices, with a non-significant χ2  value indicating good fit.  Because the χ2 
test is sensitive to large sample sizes, it has become standard practice to supplement this 
analysis with other measures of model fit.   
 The remaining commonly reported fit indices evaluate other aspects of the 
observed data relative to the hypothesized model.  The Root-Mean-Square-Error-of-
Approximation (RMSEA) compares the sample covariance matrix with a hypothetical 
population covariance matrix, fitted per degree of freedom.  Good model fit is reflected 
by RMSEA values of .08 or less (Vandenberg and Lance, 2000).  A second fit index, 
the Standardized Root Mean Squared Residual (SRMR) represents the average 
standardized residual obtained when the sample variance-covariance matrix is fitted to 
the hypothesized model; good models yield values of .10 or less (Vandenberg & Lance, 
2000). 
 The Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) indicates the amount of variance in the 
observed data explained by the hypothesized model; the GFI is an absolute measure of 
fit corresponding approximately to the R2 statistic (Byrne, 1998).  The Comparative Fit 
Index (CFI) is an incremental fit index, measuring the observed data against a fully 
restricted baseline model (Hu & Bentler, 1995).  Also reported in the present study is 
the Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI; also called the Tucker-Lewis Index), another 
incremental fit index comparing the observed data to a null model.  GFI, CFI, and NNFI 
values of .90 or higher indicate adequate model fit (Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). 
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  The final fit statistic to be reported in the present investigation is the test for 
difference in χ2  between nested models.  This is the preferred method for comparing the 
hypothesized structural model to both the measurement model and to more or less 
constrained structural models.  Where changes in χ2 are significant (p < .05), less 
constrained models are progressively tested, as recommended by Anderson and Gerbing 
(1988) in the procedures described above.  After adequate measurement and structural 
models have been established, significance levels of individual path coefficients are 



















Descriptive Statistics   
Means, standard deviations, intercorrelations, and reliabilities are reported in 
Tables 2 and 3.  Most of the reliabilities (coefficient alpha) were in acceptable ranges, 
although the reliabilities of competence (α = .61), dutifulness, (α = .63) and impulsivity 
(α = .66) were below the commonly accepted cutoff of .70 (Nunnally & Bernstein, 
1994).  The correlations reported in Table 2 provide initial support for the relationships 
posited by social cognitive theory.  Specifically, Time 1 self-efficacy was significantly 
correlated both with Time 1 goals (r = .23, p < .01) and with performance (r = .20,  
p < .01).  The relationship between Time 1 goal level and performance was also 
significant in the expected direction (r = .32, p < .01). 
Correlations between global conscientiousness, the facets of conscientiousness, 
the motivational constructs, and performance are reported in Table 2.  Global 
conscientiousness was positively related to self-efficacy at both Time 1 (r = .17, 
p < .05) and at Time 2 (r = .23, p < .01).  However, conscientiousness was not related to 
goal level at either Time 1 or Time 2 (r = .04, n.s., and r =.05, n.s., respectively), but 
was marginally related to performance (r = .13, p = .06).  Three of the 
conscientiousness facets were correlated with self-efficacy at both Time 1 and Time 2, 
including competence (r = .21, p < .01 and r =.25, p < .01, respectively) dutifulness  
(r = .18, p < .01 and r =.24, p < .01) and achievement-striving (r = .19, p < .01 and  
r =.29, p < .01).  Order was related to self-efficacy only at Time 2 (r = .14, p < .05).   
The only significant relationship between the conscientiousness facets and goal level 




Descriptive Statistics, Reliability Coefficients, and Correlation Coefficients: Conscientiousness and Facets 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Variable     M  SD    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9   10   11   12   13 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Conscientiousness 2.37 .47 (.86) 
2. Competence  2.60 .48 .78** (.61)  
3. Order   .22 .65 .74** .49** (.74)  
4.  Dutifulness  2.64 .55 .77** .55** .42** (.63)  
5.  Achievement  2.34 .65 .79** .57** .52** .52** (.81)  
6.  Self-Discipline 2.27 .77 .86** .61** .55** .60** .70** (.85)  
7.  Deliberation  2.09 .65 .69** .49** .42** .50** .33** .44** (.78)  
8.  Wonderlic   24.16 4.33 .01 .08 .00 .03 .03 -.03 -.01 (.90)a  
9.  Self-efficacy t1 3.82 .58 .17* .21** .01 .18** .19** .10 .05 .12 (.81)  
10. Self-efficacy t2 3.75 .62 .23** .25** .14* .24** .29** .13 .06 .02 .61** (.83)  
11.  Goal t1  85.13 6.03 .04 .11 -.02 .12 .14* -.01 -.12 .23** .33** .26** (.90)a  
12.  Goal t2  85.95 6.75 .05 .10 .01 .09 .11 .00 -.04 .26** .25** .26** .52** (.90)a  
13.  Test Score   77.33 12.61 .13 .04 -.05 .23** .22** .10 .05 .20** .21** .29** .32** .33** (.90)a  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note: N  = 220.  Cronbach’s alphas are reported in parentheses on the diagonal. 




dutifulness and achievement-striving, were significantly related to test performance (r = 
.23, p < .01 and r =.22, p < .01, respectively).  Thus, there appears to be initial support for 
some of the hypothesized relationships between conscientiousness, its facets, and the 
motivational and performance constructs. 
Correlations between neuroticism, its facets, and the motivational and 
performance variables are reported in Table 3. Global neuroticism was significantly 
correlated with self- efficacy at Time 1 (r = -.13, p = .05 ) but not at Time 2 (r = -.07, 
n.s.); neuroticism was  uncorrelated with goal level on both occasions (r = -.04, n.s., and r 
= .00, n.s., respectively) and with performance (r = .06, n.s.).  Among the neuroticism 
facets, depression was significantly related to self-efficacy at both Time 1 (r = -.16, p < 
.05) and Time 2 (r = -.14, p < .05).   Vulnerability was related to self-efficacy at Time 1 
(r = -.17, p < .05), but not at Time 2 (r = -.10, n.s.).  None of the neuroticism facets were 
related to goal level.  The relationship between anxiety and test performance was 
significant, but in the positive direction (r = .15, p < .05).  Thus, initial inspection of the 
relationships between neuroticism, its facets, and the motivation and performance 
constructs provides only limited support for the hypotheses. 
Collinearity diagnostics.  One of the concerns of the present investigation is the 
potential for multicollinearity, which can occur when predictor variables are highly 
correlated among themselves (Cohen & Cohen, 1983).  Because the primary facets of the 
personality scales are designed to load on common second order factors  
(conscientiousness and neuroticism), high intercorrelations among these scales could be 
expected.   
 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics, Reliability Coefficients, and Correlation Coefficients: Neuroticism and Facets   
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Variable     M  SD    1   2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10    11    12    13  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1.  Neuroticism  2.08 .49 (.89) 
2.  Anxiety  2.45 .72 .81** (.81)  
3.  Hostility  1.80 .68 .68** .42** (.79) 
4.  Depression  2.07 .76 .83** .63** .43** (.83)  
5.  Self-conscious 2.12 .85 .77** .48** .33** .63** (.72 ) 
6.  Impulsivity  2.34 .59 .49** .62** .34** .63** .18** (.66)  
7.  Vulnerability  1.72 .61 .81** .61** .44** .65** .59** .30** (.78)  
8.  Wonderlic   24.16 4.33 -.09 -.11 -.08 -.10 -.04 -.04 -.07 (.88)a  
9.  Self-efficacy t1 3.82 .58 -.13*  -.03 -.10 -.16*  -.13 .00 -.17*  .12 (.81)  
10. Self-efficacy t2 3.75 .62 -.07 .04 .03 -.14*  -.08 -.04 -.10 .02 .61** (.83)  
11. Goal t1  85.13 6.03 -.04 -.01 -.06 -.05 -.01 .06 -.12 .23** .33** .25** (.90) a   
12. Goal t2  85.75 6.75 .00 .08 -.07 -.01 .02 .03 -.05 .26** .26** .26** .52** (.90) a   
13. Test score  77.33 12.61 .06 .15* -.10 .01 .07 .05 .01 .20** .21** .29** .32** .33** (.90)a  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: N  = 220.  Cronbach’s alphas are reported in parentheses on the diagonal. 
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Multicollinearity can cause large swings in regression coefficients, excessively 
wide confidence intervals, or even regression coefficients with signs in the opposite 
direction of the bivariate relationships (Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim, & Wasserman, 
1996).  Initial inspection of the correlations among the facets of conscientiousness 
(Mean r = .51) and neuroticism (Mean r = .49) showed that multicollinearity was a 
potential concern; therefore, diagnostics for this condition were conducted using 
procedures outlined in the SPSS Base 10 Applications Guide (SPSS, 1999).  
The first collinearity analyses examined the facets of conscientiousness and 
neuroticism for tolerance, defined as 1 - R2i, where R2i represents the squared multiple 
correlation of a variable with the other predictors.  Tolerance values range from 0 to 1; 
levels approaching zero indicate potential multicollinearity (SPSS, 1999).  The lowest 
tolerance for the conscientiousness facets was .39 (self-discipline); the rest were greater 
than .45.  The lowest tolerance among the neuroticism facets was .44 (depression).  
Thus, multicollinearity was not indicated by analyses of tolerances among either the 
conscientiousness or the neuroticism facets. 
A second method of evaluating independent variables for multicollinearity is 
through inspection of condition indices, which represent the ratios of the greatest 
eigenvalues (standardized linear relationships among independent variables) to 
successive eigenvalues.  A condition index larger than 15 may be indicative of 
multicollinearity, whereas values exceeding 30 indicate serious problems (SPSS, 1999).  
The condition index for the combined conscientiousness facets was 23.67, indicating 
potential concern; the condition index for the neuroticism facets was 16.48, suggesting 
that multicollinearity may be a lesser concern for neuroticism.  The discovery of 
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possible multicollinearity effects among the personality facets impacted the model-
fitting strategy, as discussed below.    
Tests of Hypotheses  
 In the introductory section of this paper, the hypotheses for conscientiousness 
and its facets were presented first for Time 1 and Time 2, followed by the hypotheses 
for neuroticism at Time 1 and Time 2.  However, because of differences in the analytic 
strategies used for Time 1 and Time 2 analyses, the results section will be structured 
slightly differently.  After reviewing results for the hypothesis tests related to social 
cognitive theory (Hypotheses 1 through 5) all Time 1 analyses, for both 
conscientiousness and neurotic ism, will be presented, followed by all Time 2 analyses.  
Thus, in order to make the presentation of results clear and precise, some of the Time 2 
hypotheses will be tested out of sequence from their original presentation in the 
introduction.  A summary of all hypothesis tests is presented in Table 6 (p. 75-76). 
          Tests of Social Cognitive Theory Predictions.  Hypotheses 1 through 5 delineated 
expected relationships between ability, self-efficacy, goal level, and performance, based 
on social cognitive theory (SCT).  Because these core relationships are common to all 
the Time 1 models (Figure 1), the first step was to determine whether the hypothesized 
relationships according to SCT were supported.  Structural equation modeling was 
employed to test these hypotheses; results of these analyses are presented in Table 4.  
The measurement model (Model 1) fit the data quite well (χ2 (6) = 5.78; RMSEA = .00; 
SRMR = .03; GFI = .99; CFI = 1.00; NNFI = 1.00).  The hypothesized model (Model 
2), however, showed a significant decrement in fit relative to Model 1 (∆χ2 (1) = 8.39, p 





Fit Indices for Covariance Structural Analysis: Social Cognitive Theory Constructs 
 
  Model number and type χ2 df RMSEA SRMR GFI CFI NNFI ∆χ2 
1.  Measurement model 5.78 6 0.00 .03 .99 1.00 1.00  
2.  Hypothesized model 14.17 7 .042 .07 .96 .97 .97 8.39** 
3.  Alternate model (a) 5.76 6 0.00 .03 .99 1.00 1.00  
 
Note: n = 220.  RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; SRMR = 
Standardized Root Mean Residual; GFI = Goodness of Fit Index; CFI = Comparative 
Fit Index; NNFI = Non-Normed Fit Index. 

















demonstrated in previous research (Barrick, Mount, & Strauss, 1996; Hollenbeck & 
Brief, 1987; Thomas & Mathieu, 1994), an alternate model was tested (Model 3) in 
which a path was estimated between these variables.  Because all paths were estimated 
in this model (i.e., the model was saturated), the fit statistics were equivalent to the 
measurement model.  Ability accounted for 2% of the variance in self-efficacy; ability 
and self-efficacy explained 18% of the variance in goals; and ability, self-efficacy and 
goals explained 14% of the variance in performance.  This model is presented in  
Figure 7. 
Hypothesis 1, which predicted a positive relationship between self-efficacy and 
goals, was supported (β  = .36, p < .01).  Additionally, goal level was positively related 
to performance, as predicted by Hypothesis 2 (β  = .25, p < .01).  Hypothesis 3 predicted 
that the relationship between self-efficacy and performance would be partially mediated 
by goals; the path coefficient from self-efficacy to performance was marginally 
significant when goal level was controlled (β  = .13, p = .07).  Because the significant 
bivariate self-efficacy/performance relationship (r = .20, p < .05) provided evidence of a 
direct path between these constructs, Hypothesis 3 was marginally supported.  
Hypothesis 4 predicted that ability would positively impact performance; this 
hypothesis was supported (β  = .13, p < .05).  The ability-self-efficacy relationship was 
also significant (β  = .14, p = .05); thus, Hypothesis 5 was also supported.  Although not 
originally hypothesized, there was a significant relationship between ability and goal 





Figure 7.  Standardized Path model for Ability, Self-Efficacy, Goal, and Performance.  
 a.  Estimated (Anderson & Gerbing, 1989) 
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In short, the relationships between ability, the motivational constructs, and 
performance were consistent with social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1997; Locke & 
Latham, 1990).   These core relationships were not modified in subsequent model 
testing.  The relationships between self-efficacy, goals, and performance were relatively 
unchanged across the various model tests.  However, the role of ability as a predictor of 
motivation and performance was affected to a greater extent with the introduction of 
personality factors, as noted below. 
Tests of Time 1 Models 
Global conscientiousness.  Hypothesis 6 predicted that the relationship between 
conscientiousness and performance would be partially mediated by self-efficacy and 
goals (see Figure 1).  The measurement model fit the data well (χ2  (47) = 106.84; 
RMSEA = .072;  SRMR = .05; GFI = .93; CFI = .93; NNFI = .90).  Examination of the 
hypothesized structural model also indicated good overall fit (χ2 (49) = 106.87;  
RMSEA = .070; SRMR = .06; GFI = .93;  CFI = .93; NNFI = .90), and was not 
significantly worse than the measurement model (∆χ2 (2) = .03, n.s.).  The structural 
model is presented in Figure 8.  The path between conscientiousness and self-efficacy 
was significant (β  = .23, p < .01), whereas conscientiousness and goals were unrela ted 
(β  = .06, n.s.).  However, conscientiousness had a modest independent effect on 
performance (β  = .11, p = .06).  Ability and conscientiousness accounted for 7% of the 
variance in self-efficacy.  Conscientiousness, ability, and self-efficacy accounted for 
19% of the variance in goal level.  Finally, conscientiousness, ability, self-efficacy, and 
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Figure 8.  Standardized Path Model for Global Conscientiousness, Ability, Self-
Efficacy, Goal, and Performance (Model 2; Time 1). 
























was significantly related to self-efficacy, marginally related to performance, and 
unrelated to goals.  Thus, Hypothesis 6 received partial support.   
Conscientiousness facet models.  Hypotheses 7, 8, and 9 predicted various 
relationships between the facets of conscientiousness and self-efficacy, goals, and 
performance (see Figure 2).  Hypothesis 7 predicted that the relationships between the 
competence and dutifulness facets and performance would be fully mediated by self-
efficacy.  Hypothesis 8 predicted that the relationships between the order, deliberation, 
and self-discipline facets would be partially mediated by self-efficacy.  Finally, 
Hypothesis 9 predicted that the relationship between achievement-striving and 
performance would be partially mediated by goals.  Results of the analyses are shown in 
Table 5.  The measurement model (Model 1) fit the data fairly well (χ2 (210) = 293.68; 
RMSEA = .041; SRMR = .05; GFI = .90; CFI = .96; NNFI = .94).  A single structural 
model (Model 2) was examined to test Hypotheses 7, 8, and 9.  This model showed a 
significant decrement in fit with respect to the measurement model (∆χ2 (15) = 33.80, p 
< .01).  Based on an examination of the regression coefficients and modification indices 
of this model, an alternate model (Model 3) was tested, in which all paths for order, 
achievement, and self-discipline were constrained to zero, and paths were added from 
dutifulness and deliberation to goal, and from competence to performance.  Fit statistics 
for this model were satisfactory (χ2 (229) = 320.99; RMSEA = .042; SRMR = .05; 
GFI= .89; CFI = .95; NNFI = .94); additionally, this model did not result in a significant 
chi-square change compared to the measurement model (∆χ2 (19) = 27.31, n.s.).  In 
Model 3, ability and competence accounted for 8% of the variance in self- efficacy; 




Fit Indices for Covariance Structural Analysis: Conscientiousness Facet Models (Time 
1) 
  Model number and type χ2 df RMSEA SRMR GFI CFI NNFI ∆χ2 
1. Measurement model 293.68 210 .041 .05 .90 .96 .94  
2. Hypothesized model 326.48 225 .043 .05 .89 .94 .93 34** 
3.  Alternate (a) 320.99 229 .041 .05 .89 .95 .94 27 ns 
4.  Alternate (b) 268.16 229 .027 .05 .91 .98 .97  
Note: n = 220.  RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; SRMR = 
Standardized Root Mean Residual; GFI = Goodness of Fit Index; CFI = Comparative 
Fit Index; NNFI = Non-Normed Fit Index. 
a.  Drop order, dutifulness, self-discipline, deliberationàself-efficacy.  Drop 
achievement-strivingàgoal.  Drop order, achievement-striving, self-discipline, 
deliberationàperformance.  Add dutifulness, deliberationàgoal.  Add competence, 
dutifulnessàperformance. 
b.  Ridge model: Constant (c = 0.05) added to diagonal of variance/covariance matrix of 
predictor variables of Model 3. 













was significant, suggesting that some of the variance in ability’s effects on motivation 
and performance overlapped that of the facets.  Ability, dutifulness, deliberation, and 
self-efficacy accounted for 21% of the variance in goals.  Ability, competence, 
dutifulness, self-efficacy, and goals explained 35% of the variance in performance.  
Model 3 is presented in Figure 9.    
It can be seen in Figure 9 that the signs of some of the relationships between the 
facets and the dependent variables do not reflect either the findings of previous research 
or the bivariate correlations (Table 2).  Specifically, regression coefficients were 
negative between competence and performance (β = −.61) and deliberation and 
goals (β = -.37), whereas the pairwise correlations between the same constructs were 
nonsignificant (r = .04, n.s., and r = -.12, n.s.)  These results suggested that 
multicollinearity among the facets may have destabilized the regression coefficients.  
As discussed previously, tests for the presence of multicollinearity in the facets of 
conscientiousness were not conclusive; however, because unstable (i.e., reverse-signed) 
regression coefficients can be indicative of multicollinearity (Neter et al., 1996) a ridge 
regression option in LISREL was conducted on the data in Model 3. 
Ridge regression is a procedure for reducing the effects of multicollinearity by 
systematically adding positive values to the main diagonal of the variance/covariance 
matrix of the predictor variables (Bobko, 1990).  The technique entails accepting a 
small amount of bias in the regression coefficients in return for reducing the sampling 
variance in the predictor variance/covariance matrix, on the rationale that ordinary least 
squares regression coefficients are inflated (in absolute values) when multicollinearity is 
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Figure 9.  Standardized Path Model for Facets of Conscientiousness, Ability, Self-
Efficacy, Goal, and Performance (Time 1).   




















Unlike some statistical programs (e.g., SAS), LISREL 8.3 (Joreskog & Sorbom, 
1996) does not compute a ridge trace automatically; therefore, the analyst must 
manually enter the biasing constants.  In the present analyses values were entered 
progressively starting with a ridge value of 0.01, the default starting value in LISREL, 
and proceeded in .01 increments.  At each step the regression coefficients, explained 
variances in the dependent variables, and overall model fit were inspected.  The desired 
outcome of these analyses was a model in which the beta values were positive (i.e., 
consistent with the bivariate relationships), with minimal sacrifices in terms of 
explained variance.  Because sampling variance was reduced at each iteration, the fit 
statistics improved as the biasing constant was increased. 
 With the ridge constant set at 0.01, there was no chan7ge in the direction of the 
regression coefficients, and little change in explained variance or model fit.  With the 
ridge constant set at 0.05 (Model 4) the fit statistics were satisfactory (χ2  (229) = 
268.16; RMSEA = .027;  SRMR = .05; GFI = .91; CFI = .98; NNFI = .97), but there 
was less explained variance compared to the unbiased model both for goals (9% vs. 
20%) and performance (26% vs. 35%).  Both models explained the same amount of 
variance in self-efficacy (8%).  More importantly, there was no evidence of changing 
signs in the regression coefficients in the structural model.  In fact, the relationship 
between competence and performance increased in the negative direction (β = -.75 vs. 
β = -.61), whereas the dutifulness/goal relationship remained unchanged (β = -
.37).  Increasing the biasing constant to higher levels did not change these fundamental 
relationships.  Thus, ridge regression was not an effective remedy for the opposite-
signed regression coefficients in the structural models.  A similar finding was reported 
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by Pagel and Lunneborg (1985) who showed that ridge regression outperforms ordinary 
least squares methods only when sample sizes are small and R2 values are less than .10.  
Bobko (1990) also notes that ridge regression procedures are only effective where 
multicollinearity is present.  Therefore, although the collinearity diagnostics for the 
facets of conscientiousness (discussed above) were inconclusive, results of the ridge 
analyses suggest that the unexpected pattern of regression coefficients in the 
conscientiousness facet models was probably not attributable to multicollinearity.   
 A second possible explanation for the negatively signed regression coefficients 
in the conscientiousness facet models is suppression.  Suppression exists when the 
predictive validity of an independent variable is increased when additional independent 
variables are added to a regression equation (Smith, Ager, & Williams, 1992).  As with 
multicollinearity, the effect of suppression can be a reversal of sign in predictor-
criterion relationships (Cohen & Cohen, 1993).  Thus, suppression is a reasonable 
explanation for both the opposite-signed beta weight in the competence-performance 
relationship and the inflated negative beta weight in the deliberation-goal relationship.  
The suppression explanation will be returned to in the Discussion. 
Global neuroticism models.   Hypothesis 14 predicted that the relationship 
between global neuroticism and performance would be partially mediated by self-
efficacy and goal level (see Figure 1).  The measurement model fit the data very well 
(χ2  (47) = 62.51; RMSEA = .036; SRMR = .05; GFI = .96; CFI = .98; NNFI = .97).  
The hypothesized structural model also exhibited satisfactory overall fit (χ2 (48) = 
64.48; RMSEA = .037; SRMR = .05; GFI = .95;  CFI = .98; NNFI = .97), and was not 
significantly different from the measurement model (∆χ2 (1) = 1.97, n.s.).  Neuroticism 
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was significantly related to self-efficacy (β  = -.18, p < .01), but unrelated to both goals 
and performance (β  = .02, n.s. and β  = .09, n.s., respectively).  Thus Hypothesis 14 was 
not supported.  Neuroticism and ability accounted for 5% of the variance in self-
efficacy.  Neuroticism, ability, and self-efficacy accounted for 19% of the variance in 
goals.  Finally, neuroticism, ability, self-efficacy, and goals accounted for 15% of the 
variance in performance.  The structural model is shown in Figure 10.   
Neuroticism facet models.  Hypotheses were developed for only four of the 
facets of neuroticism.  Hypothesis 15 predicted that the relationships between anxiety 
and vulnerability would be partially mediated by self-efficacy.  Hypothesis 16 predicted 
that the depression / performance relationship would be partially mediated by goals, and 
Hypothesis 17 predicted that impulsiveness would directly impact performance.  The 
measurement model fit the data well (χ2 (110) = 145.32; RMSEA = .033; SRMR = .04; 
GFI = .94; CFI = .97; NNFI = .96).   The hypothesized structural model also provided 
satisfactory fit (χ2 (119) = 154.17; RMSEA = .033; SRMR = .04; GFI = .94; CFI = .97; 
NNFI = .96), and was not significantly worse than the measurement model (∆χ2 (9) = 
8.85, n.s.).       
The structural model is shown in Figure 11.  Anxiety was significantly related to 
both self-efficacy (β  = .34, p < .01) and performance (β = .54, p < .01).  Vulnerability 
was related to self-efficacy (β = -.50, p < .01), but not to performance (β = -.19, n.s.).  
Thus Hypothesis 15 received moderate support.  Depression was not significantly 
related to goals (β = -.06, n.s.) but had a unique impact on performance (β = -.31, p < 
.01); impulsivity had no direct relationship with performance (β = -.04, n.s.); thus, 
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Figure 10.  Standardized Path Model for Global Neuroticism, Ability, Self-Efficacy, 
Goal, and Performance (Time 1). 
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Figure 11: Standardized Path Model for Facets of Neuroticism, Ability, Self-Efficacy, 
Goal, and Performance (Time 1). 





















for 14% of the variance in self-efficacy.  Ability, depression and self-efficacy accounted 
for 21% of the variance in goals.  Ability, anxiety, vulnerability, depression, 
impulsivity, self-efficacy, and goals explained 24% of the variance in performance.    
 Interestingly, examination of the correlation matrix (Table 3) shows that the 
bivariate correlation between anxiety and performance was positive (r = .15, p  < .05), 
while the correlation between anxiety and self-efficacy, although negative, was non-
significant (r = -.03, n.s.).  Thus, the unusual positive relationships between anxiety and 
self-efficacy and performance do not appear be an effect of unstable regression 
coefficients associated with multicollinearity, although it appears that suppression may 
have occurred, as with the conscientiousness facet models.  However, these results are 
not consistent with previous research (Matthews, Derryberry, & Siegle, 2000) or theory 
(Ahrens, Zeiss, & Kanfer, 1988) and should be investigated in future research.  It is 
possible that high-anxiety individuals experienced more energized affect (Carver & 
Scheier, 1998), causing them to adopt an approach orientation to the task.  This may 
have resulted in greater preparation and more effortful studying for the exam.   
Tests of Time 2 Models 
 Analyses.  Because all paths are estimated in the covariance structural analyses 
for Time 2 hypotheses (i.e., the models were just identified; see Figures 4, 5, and 6), no 
chi-square changes occur between the measurement models and the structural models in 
these analyses.  Therefore only the fit statistics for the measurement models and path 
coefficients for the structural models are reported.  In other words, all Time 2 
 
64 
hypotheses were tested by inspection of path coefficients in the structural models after 
establishing the adequacy of the measurement models.    
 Global Conscientiousness.  Hypothesis 10 predicted that global 
conscientiousness would explain unique variance in Time 2 self-efficacy, after 
controlling for the effects of Time 1 self-efficacy and performance.  Indices of fit for the 
global conscientiousness measurement model were satisfactory (χ2 (60) = 122.87; 
RMSEA = .068; SRMR = .06; GFI = .92; CFI = .95; NNFI = .93).  The structural model 
accounted for 60% of the variance in Time 2 self-efficacy.  The path coefficient 
between conscientiousness and Time 2 self-efficacy was marginally significant (β  = .10, 
p = .07); thus, Hypothesis 10 was weakly supported, such that global conscientiousness 
explained 1% of the variance in Time 2 self-efficacy when Time 1 self-efficacy and 
performance were controlled. 
Hypothesis 11 predicted that global conscientiousness would explain unique 
variance in goal level at Time 2, when the effects of Time 1 goals and performance 
were controlled.  The measurement model fit the data adequately (χ2 (24) = 76.87; 
RMSEA = .09; SRMR = .06;  GFI = .93; CFI = .92; NNFI = .89).  The regression 
coefficient from conscientiousness to Time 2 goal level was non-significant (β  = .01, 
n.s.); thus, Hypothesis 11 was unsupported.  The structural model for both self-efficacy 
and goals is shown in Figure 12, with the path coefficients for goals shown in brackets.  
 Conscientiousness Facets.  Hypothesis 12 predicted that two facets of 
conscientiousness (achievement-striving and self-discipline) would predict Time 2 self-
efficacy when the effects of Time 1 self-efficacy and performance were controlled.  The 





Figure 12: Standardized Path Model for Global Conscientiousness, Time 1 Self-
Efficacy, Time 1 Goals, Performance, Time 2 Self-efficacy, and Time 2 Goals. 
(Note:  Path coefficients for goals are in parentheses).   
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= .96;  CFI = .99; NNFI = .99).  Achievement-striving was significantly related to Time 
2 self-efficacy (β  = .36, p < .01).  Self- discipline and Time 2 self-efficacy were also 
significantly related (β  = -.25, p < .05).  The negative-signed regression coefficient for 
self-discipline was not consistent with the bivariate relationship between self-discipline 
and Time 2 self-efficacy (r = .13, n.s.; see Table 2).  A ridge regression was conducted 
on the model, using procedures described above, with no effect on the sign.  Therefore 
it is likely that suppression contributed to this effect.  The model accounted for 64% of 
the variance in Time 2 self-efficacy, of which 5% was attributable to personality.  Thus, 
Hypothesis 12 was supported.  The model is presented in Figure 13. 
Hypothesis 13 predicted that achievement-striving and self-discipline would 
account for unique variance in Time 2 goals, controlling for Time 1 goals and 
performance.  The measurement model exhibited excellent fit (χ2 (20) = 17.19;  
RMSEA = 0.0; SRMR = .02; GFI = .98; CFI = 1.00; NNFI = 1.00).  However, neither 
achievement-striving (β  = .04, n.s.) nor self-discipline (β  = -.05, n.s.) was significantly 
related to Time 2 goals, when the effects of Time 1 goals and performance were 
controlled.  Thus, Hypothesis 13 was unsupported.  Figure 14 shows the structural 
model tested.  
Global Neuroticism.  Hypothesis 18 predicted that global neuroticism would 
explain unique variance in Time 2 self-efficacy when initial self-efficacy levels and 
performance were controlled.  The measurement model provided satisfactory fit to the 
data (χ2  (60) = 93.13; RMSEA = .05; SRMR = .05; GFI = .94; CFI = .97; NNFI = .96).  
Neuroticism was not significantly related to Time 2 self-efficacy (β  = .03, n.s.).  Thus 





Figure 13: Standardized Path Model for Achievement-striving, Self-discipline, Time 1 
Self-Efficacy, Performance, and Time 2 Self-Efficacy.   
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Figure 14:  Standardized Path model for Achievement-striving, Self-discipline, Time 1 
Goal, Performance, and Time 2 Goal. 
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Hypothesis 19 predicted that neuroticism would account for variance in goal level at 
Time 2 when the effects of Time 1 goals and performance were controlled.  The 
measurement model was acceptable (χ2 (24) = 38.77; RMSEA = .05; SRMR = .05; 
GFI = .96; CFI = .98;NNFI = .96).  The regression coefficient from neuroticism to Time 
2 goal was non-significant (β  = .02, n.s.); thus, Hypothesis 19 was unsupported.  The 
structural models for neuroticism, Time 2 self-efficacy, and Time 2 goals are shown in 
Figure 15, with regression coefficients for the goal model appearing in brackets.    
Neuroticism Facets.  Hypothesis 20 predicted that three facets of neuroticism 
(anxiety, depression, and vulnerability) would affect Time 2 self-efficacy independently 
of the effects of Time 1 self-efficacy and  previous performance.  The measurement 
model fit the data well (χ2  (90) = 108.72; RMSEA = .03; SRMR = .04; GFI = .94; CFI 
= .99; NNFI = .98).  Neither anxiety (β  = .10, n.s.), depression (β  = -.07, n.s.) nor 
vulnerability (β  = .02, n.s.) contributed independently to Time 2 self-efficacy; therefore, 
Hypothesis 20 was also unsupported.  The structural model is presented in Figure 16.  
Hypothesis 21 predicted that three facets of neuroticism (anxiety, depression, 
and vulnerability) would be related to Time 2 goals independently of Time 1 goals and 
performance.  The measurement model fit the data well (χ2  (42) = 38.77; RMSEA = 
.03;  SRMR = .04; GFI = .96; CFI = .99; NNFI = .98).  Neither anxiety (β  = .20, n.s.), 
depression (β  = -.10, n.s.) nor vulnerability (β  = -.13, n.s.) was significantly related to 
Time 2 goal level; thus, Hypothesis 21 was unsupported.  The structural model is shown 







Figure 15: Standardized Path Model for Global Neuroticism, Time 1 Self-Efficacy, 
Time 1 Goals, Performance, Time 2 Self-Efficacy, and Time 2 Goals. 
(Note:  Path coefficients for goals are in parentheses). 
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Figure 16: Standardized Path Model for Anxiety, Depression, Vulnerability, Time 1 
Self-Efficacy, Performance, and Time 2 Self-Efficacy.   
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Figure 17:  Standardized Path Model for Anxiety, Depression, Vulnerability, Time 1 
Goal, Performance, and Time 2 Goal. 
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Summary of Findings 
This investigation has had three broad objectives.  The first objective was to 
extend previous research examining the roles of personality and motivation in 
predicting performance.  A second aim was to determine whether operationalizing 
conscientiousness and neuroticism at facet levels would explain more variance in 
motivation and performance than global- level operationalizations.  The third objective 
was to explore the role of personality factors in changes in motivation over time.  
Hypotheses related to these objectives were tested using structural equation modeling.  
A summary of the hypothesis tests is presented in Table 6. 
Social cognitive theory model.  Hypotheses 1 through 5 concerned the 
relationships between cognitive ability, self-efficacy, goals, and performance.  
Predictions that ability would impact self-efficacy and performance were supported; 
additionally, there was a significant, positive relationship between ability and goal level.  
Consistent with models advanced by Bandura (1997) and Locke and Latham (1990), 
both self-efficacy and goals were predictive of higher levels of performance, with goals 
partially mediating the effects of self-efficacy on performance. 
  Conscientiousness.  There was partial support for Hypothesis 6, which 
predicted that global conscientiousness would account for unique variance in self-
efficacy, goals, and performance.  Specifically, global conscientiousness predicted self-
efficacy and performance, but was unrelated to self-set goals (see Figure 8).  A similar 
result was reported by Gellatly (1996), where conscientiousness was more strongly 




Summary of results by hypothesis 
Hypothesis Result 
 
1.  There will be a positive relationship between self-








3.  Goal level will partially mediate the relationship 
between self-efficacy and performance 
 
Supported 








6.  The path between conscientiousness and performance  
will be partially mediated by self-efficacy and goals. 
Supported for self-efficacy.  
Not supported for goals. 
 
7.  The paths between the competence and dutifulness 




 8.  The relationships between the order, deliberation, and 





9.  The relationship between achievement-striving and 
performance will be partially mediated by goal level. 
 
Not supported. 
10. Conscientiousness will explain unique variance in 
Time 2 self-efficacy, controlling for s/e and performance 
at Time 1. 
 
Not supported 
11.  Conscientiousness will explain unique variance in 




12.  Self-discipline and achievement-striving will explain 
unique variance in Time 2 self-efficacy, controlling for 
self-efficacy and performance at Time 1. 
Supported for achievement-




Table 6 (cont’d) 
 
 
                 Hypothesis  Result 
 
 
13.  Self-discipline and achievement-striving will explain 
unique variance in Time 2 goals, controlling for goals and 




14.  The path between neuroticism and performance will 
be partially mediated by self-efficacy and goals. 
 
Not supported. 
15.  The relationships between the anxiety and 
vulnerability facets and performance will be partially 





16.  The relationship between depression and performance 
will be partially mediated by goal level. 
Not supported. 
 




18.  Neuroticism will explain unique variance in Time 2 
self-efficacy, controlling for self-efficacy and performance 
at  
Time 1.  
Not supported. 
19.  Neuroticism will explain unique variance in Time 2 
goals, controlling for goals and performance at Time 1.  
Not supported. 
 
20.  Anxiety, vulnerability, and depression will explain 
unique variance in Time 2 self-efficacy, controlling for 
self-efficacy and performance at Time 1. 
Not supported. 
 
21.  Anxiety, vulnerability, and depression will explain          Not supported 
unique variance in Time 2 goals, controlling for goals 




than in setting actual goals.  Hypotheses 7, 8, and 9 stated that particular facets of 
conscientiousness would explain unique variance in self-efficacy, goals, and 
performance.  Although the bivariate relationships were supportive of some of these 
hypotheses (e.g., achievement-striving was related to self-efficacy, goals, and 
performance), the only facets with significant unique effects in the structural models 
were competence, dutifulness, and deliberation.  Hypothesis 7, which predicted that 
self-efficacy would fully mediate the relationships between competence, dutifulness, 
and performance, was unsupported.  Although competence was related to self-efficacy, 
there was also an independent competence/performance link, suggesting partial 
mediation.  Dutifulness was related to goals rather than to self-efficacy, and also had a 
unique impact on performance, ruling out a mediating effect for self-efficacy.  The 
direct link between dutifulness and performance may be a function of the type of 
performance investigated.  That is, test performance is affected by sustained effort and 
diligence in studying and attending class over a period of time, which may relate to a 
person’s dispositional dutifulness.   
Hypothesis 8 predicted that self-efficacy would partially mediate the effects of 
order, self-discipline, and deliberation on performance.  This hypothesis was not 
supported, as none of these facets were related to self-efficacy or performance.  These 
facets appear to share a common quality of meticulousness and orderliness that may be 
more highly correlated with long-term outcome variables than for a single test occasion.  
Finally, Hypothesis 9, which predicted that achievement-striving would impact 
performance through goals, was not supported, although achievement had significant 
zero-order correlations with both goals and performance (r = .14, p < .05 and r = .22,    
 
77 
p < .01, respectively).  Together these findings suggest that the relationships of 
achievement-striving with the dependent variables overlapped with the relationships 
between the rest of the conscientiousness facets and the dependent variables, resulting 
in non-significant paths in the structural model.  It is possible that achievement-striving 
represents a central, defining aspect of conscientiousness that is shared with the other 
facets.   
Some of the relationships between conscientiousness facets and the dependent 
variables in the structural paths were in the opposite direction of  theoretical predictions 
and the bivariate relationships between these constructs reported in Table 2.  However, 
the lack of any changes in the paths when the ridge option was employed suggested that 
multicollinearity was not the cause of such findings.  Thus, suppression is left as an 
explanation for both the opposite-signed and inflated same-sign regression coefficients 
in the structural model.  Evidence for suppression can be found by comparing the 
bivariate correlation between competence and performance (r = .04, n.s.) with the direct 
link between these constructs in the struc tural model (β  = -.61, p < .01).  This strong 
negative relationship can be interpreted from two perspectives.  First, there may have 
been unique aspects of competence that were negatively related to test performance; for 
example, it is possible that competent students were overconfident (which may be 
reflected by the positive relationship between competence and self-efficacy in the path 
model: β  = .27, p < .01); consequently, these students may have been deficient in their 
test preparations.  The second perspective suggests that after most of the variance in test 
performance was accounted for by the other predictors (i.e., the remaining 
conscientiousness facets, motivational processes, and ability), the remaining portion of 
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the criterion was negatively related to performance.  It is difficult to judge how to 
interpret such effects.  However, additional theoretical development and replication may 
shed light on these findings. 
Regardless of the specific interpretation of path coefficients, results for 
conscient iousness models provided some evidence that measurement at the facet level 
increases criterion-related validity compared to global conscientiousness.  Although the 
increase in explained variance in self-efficacy for the facet model compared to the 
global model was minimal (8% vs. 7%), the difference between operationalizations was 
greater for goals (21% vs. 18%) and performance (35% vs. 16%).  The greater 
predictive validity exhibited by facets of conscientiousness on performance measures is 
consistent with previous research (Paunonen & Ashton, 2001; Paunonen & Nicol, 2001; 
Stewart, 1999).  The present study is the first to provide similar evidence for the 
increased criterion-related validity for conscientiousness facets as predictors of 
motivational processes. 
One reason that aggregating primary level facets into composite factors may 
compromise predictive validity is that some of the facets may be unrelated to the 
criterion.  In the present study, for example, three of the conscientiousness facets (order, 
self-discipline, and deliberation) had weak bivariate relationships with most of the 
dependent variables.  These facets appear to fall into the “dependability” axis of 
conscientiousness (Hough, 1997).  Although such qualities are undoubtedly important 
determinants of job performance over time (Stewart, 1999), they appear to have been 
weakly related to motivation or performance on a single occasion (i.e., test 
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performance).  Inclusion of these facets in the global conscientiousness scale may have 
undermined this scale’s criterion-related validity. 
Generally, there was little evidence for the unique effects of conscientiousness 
on changes in self-efficacy and goal revision.  Hypothesis 10 stated that changes in self-
efficacy would be predicted by global conscientiousness.  This was weakly  supported, 
as conscientiousness was marginally significant (β  = .10, p = .07) but accounted for 
only 1% of the variance in Time 2 self-efficacy after controlling for Time 1 self-
efficacy and performance.  Hypothesis 11, which predicted that global 
conscientiousness would predict goal revision, was unsupported.  Hypothesis 12 stated 
that two of the facets of conscientiousness, achievement-striving and self-discipline, 
would explain unique variance in Time 2 self-efficacy. This hypothesis received 
stronger support, as the two facets explained 5% of the variance in the changes in self-
efficacy.  The prediction that the same two facets would capture unique variance in 
Time 2 goals (Hypothesis 13) was not supported.  In general, the Time 2 results 
reflected the Time 1 findings for conscientiousness, showing (a) stronger relationships 
with self-efficacy than goals; and (b) increased criterion-related validity associated with 
facet- level measurement compared to the global operationalization.  Models depicting 
these findings are presented in Figures 12, 13, and 14.  
Neuroticism.  Hypothesis 14, which predicted that neuroticism would impact 
performance through self-efficacy, was weakly supported.  Neuroticism negatively 
predicted self-efficacy, but was unrelated to goals and performance (see Figure 10).  
Results for the neuroticism facets are presented in Figure 11.  Hypothesis 15 stated that 
self-efficacy would partially mediate the effects of anxiety and vulnerability on 
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performance.  This hypothesis was supported, as both facets were related to self-
efficacy and to performance.  Suprisingly, however, the bivariate relationship between 
anxiety and performance (Table 3) was positive (r = .15, p < .05).  It is possible that the    
generalized anxiety construct tapped by this scale (e.g., “I am easily frightened”) 
reflected overall attitudes about life for many participants, but was not applicable to test 
performance, especially since examinations are familiar experiences to undergraduates.  
Further research is needed to better understand this relationship.  In addition, the zero-
order correlation between vulnerability and self-efficacy was negative (r = -.17,  
p < .05), as was the path coefficient between these constructs in the structural model  
(β  = -.50, p < .01).  Weaker coping skills associated with vulnerability to stress may 
have caused these participants to report lower self-efficacy beliefs. 
 Hypothesis 16 predicted that depression would uniquely predict goals and 
performance.  The relationship with goals was not significant, but depression was 
negatively related to performance.  As with other reported findings, this result was 
probably an effect of suppression, as the bivariate correlation between depression and 
performance was not significant (r = .01).  In other words, the structural path between 
depression and performance (β  = -.31, p < .01) was made stronger than the bivariate 
relationship when the other three neuroticism facets were simultaneously examined in 
the structural models.  This finding suggests that some aspect of depression that may 
not be shared by other facets of neuroticism (e.g., hopelessness) was uniquely related to 
some aspect of test performance (e.g., not being discouraged when answers do not come 
easily).  Depression was also negatively related to self-efficacy, as shown in Table 3 (r 
= -.16, p < .05).  Although not hypothesized, this finding is consistent with the tendency  
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of depressed individuals to perceive themselves in terms of skill deficits (Bandura, 
1997, p. 343).  Finally, Hypothesis 17, which predicted a direct relationship between 
impulsiveness and performance, was unsupported.    
Overall, results provided some evidence that neuroticism predicts both 
motivation and performance, and that criterion-related validities are enhanced by facet-
level operationalizations.  Global neuroticism explained unique variance in self-efficacy 
compared to a model in which ability was the only predictor (5% vs. 2%).  However, 
neuroticism accounted for minimal variance in goals (19% vs. 18%) and performance 
(15% vs. 14%) compared with models in which personality was not included.  The 
facet- level operationalization for neuroticism accounted for more variance than the 
global model in self-efficacy (14% vs. 5%) and performance (24% vs. 15%), but not in 
goals (19% for both models).  Three of the facets (anxiety, vulnerability, and 
depression) accounted for unique variance in performance.   
Global neuroticism did not account for changes in self-efficacy (Hypothesis 18) 
or  goals (Hypothesis 19).  Furthermore, predictions that facets of neuroticism would 
independently predict changes in self-efficacy and goals (Hypotheses 20 and 21) were 
unsupported.  The structural models are shown in Figures 15, 16, and 17.  Thus, the 
general prediction that neurotic individuals would be more likely to revise self-efficacy 
and goals downward following performance feedback was not supported.   
To summarize, the analyses provided relatively weak support for the specific 
hypotheses tested, such that few of the specific relationships between personality 
factors, motivation, and performance conformed exactly to the hypothesized models.  
For instance, whereas some of the personality facets (e.g., competence) were expected 
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to impact performance through self-efficacy, results indicated this facet had a direct link 
with performance.  Although few specific hypotheses were supported, this research 
provided evidence that facet- level measurement of personality accounts for greater 
criterion-related validity in motivation and performance than global operationalizations. 
The Role of Personality in the Motivation / Performance Link 
Social cognitive theory states that the effects of stable personality factors on task 
performance are fully mediated by motivational processes (Bandura, 1997; Locke & 
Latham, 1990).  This investigation has addressed arguments advanced by Bandura 
(1999) and Locke (2000) that stable individual differences are not important 
antecedents of task performance when the effects of motivational constructs (self-
efficacy and goals) are controlled.  These authors argue that such social cognitive 
processes are the causal mechanisms through which personality impacts behavior.  For 
example, Bandura (1999) points out that conscientiousness is usually measured with 
items asking the respondent to report the frequency with which he or she performs 
conscientious behaviors.  As such, it is a behavioral descriptor that becomes “reified” as 
a cause of behavior (p. 166), with no explanation for how conscientiousness might 
actually cause behavior.  Thus, the trait or dispositional approach to personality tends to 
be descriptive rather than theoretical, a criticism of trait psychology recognized by 
many Five-Factor Model theorists (e.g., Saucier & Goldberg, 1996).  Conversely, 
Bandura (1997) argues that self-efficacy and related sociocognitive processes focus on 
the person as the agentic cause of behavior, emphasizing the role of forethought to 
explain the means by which individuals govern their actions. 
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However, there is evidence showing that personality constitutes more than 
patterns of responding to self-report inventories.  For example, different streams of 
research have underlined the biological component of personality traits measured using 
the Five-Factor taxonomy.  One such program has used twin-study research 
methodology to show that there is a hereditary component to personality at both global 
and facet trait levels (Jang, McCrae, Angleitner, Riemann, & Livesly, 1998).  Similarly, 
other researchers have identified physiological “markers” (e.g., separate behavioral 
approach and inhibition systems) associated with extraversion and neuroticism 
(Pickering & Gray, 1999).  These research findings suggest that aspects of personality 
operate at a fundamental organismic level, and should not be construed superficially as 
act-frequencies or cross-situational tendencies to behave consistently in various 
contexts (cf. Mischel, 1968).  It is more informative to regard personality as a 
dispositional genotypic construct that influences the most basic tendencies of 
individuals (McCrae & Costa, 1996; 1999).   
Findings reported in the present study do not support SCT’s prediction that self-
efficacy and goals completely explain the effects of personality on performance.  Both 
conscientiousness and neuroticism, when measured at the facet level, accounted for 
unique variance in performance when the effects of self-efficacy and goal level were 
controlled.   Therefore, this investigation supports previous research (Barrick, Mount, & 
Strauss, 1996; Colquitt & Simmering, 1998) showing that motivational processes do not 
account for all the effects of personality on performance. 
The direct links from personality to performance found in the present study 
suggest that there may be other midlevel processes through which personality impacts 
 
84 
test performance.  Consistent with McCrae and Costa’s (1996) model, the mechanisms 
through which personality affects behavior are multifaceted, including not only 
motivational processes, but also affective and neuropsychological processes, skills, 
habits, interpersonal relationships, personal preferences, cultural factors, and more.  It is 
possible that conscientiousness-related constructs impact performance through non-
motivational midlevel processes such as emotional or physiological control.  For 
example, conscientious individuals may have greater stress-management skills during 
performance episodes than non-conscientious persons.  These skills may enable them to 
maintain greater task focus, and less susceptibility to distraction or rumination (Kuhl, 
2000).  In a related vein, the conscientiousness / performance relationship may be partly 
mediated by what Heckhausen (1991) refers to as volitional processes.  Volition, or 
will, refers to processes occurring during goal pursuit (e.g., initiation and maintenance 
of actions), as opposed to goal choice (Locke & Latham, 1990).  Examples include task 
persistence and determination in the face of obstacles (Heckhausen, 1991).  
Achievement-striving may affect performance partly through such volitional processes, 
as suggested by Stewart (1999).   
Results of the present study also suggest that neuroticism impacts performance 
through mechanisms other than motivation.  It should be noted that another label for 
this dimension is emotional stability, suggesting that the relationship between 
neuroticism and performance might be mediated by affective states.  The cognitive and 
affective domains are not orthogonal (Carver & Scheier, 1998); thus, depressive 
individuals, for example, may have had more difficulty recalling information due to 
interference from negative emotional states.  Additionally, they may have had lower 
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volitional energy available for task performance.  Neurotic persons may also be 
susceptible to performance decrements caused by excessive emotional self- focus, or 
disengagement (Matthews, Schwean, Campbell, Saklofske, & Mohamed, 2000).  Future 
personality research should examine such non-motivational midlevel construct as 
mediators of the personality/performance relationship.  
Global vs. Facet Prediction of Motivation and Performance 
 This study has addressed the controversy concerning which level of analys is is 
most appropriate for personality measurement, when the criterion is task performance 
(Hough & Schneider, 1996; Ones & Viswesvaran, 1996).  Although researchers have 
repeatedly called for exploration of the incremental validity of personality facets over 
global factors (Hough, 1997), little actual research in this area has been published 
(Hurtz & Donovan, 2000).  The present investigation has substantiated earlier research 
findings (Paunonen & Ashton, 2001; Stewart, 1999) showing greater predictive validity 
in motivation and performance associated with facet- level measurement.  For both 
conscientiousness and neuroticism, facet models explained more than twice the variance 
in both self-efficacy and performance compared with global models. 
 Such information can be useful to organizations that use personality testing in 
their personnel functions; for example, traits related to motivation and performance can 
be retained as part of selection systems, whereas weakly related traits need not be 
measured.  In this way the personality testing component of selection systems does not 
necessarily need to become more cumbersome through the implementation of facet- 
level measurement.  
 
86 
Personality and Changes in Self-Efficacy and Goals 
 Measurement of changes in self-efficacy and goals as a function of personality 
factors was operationalized as follows.  First, the relationships between Time 1 and 
Time 2 self-efficacy and goals represented the stability of these constructs.  Thus, 
partialling out Time 1 from Time 2 left only the changes in self-efficacy and goals.  
Links between performance and Time 2 levels represented the extent to which 
individuals changed their self-efficacy beliefs and goals based on their Time 1 
performance.  The question explored in the present study was whether personality 
factors would predict changes in self-efficacy and goals beyond the effects of 
performance.   
As discussed above, predictions that personality factors would be uniquely 
related to changes in self-efficacy were supported for conscientiousness and its facets, 
but not for neuroticism.  Achievement striving was more strongly related to Time 2 self-
efficacy than any other personality factor, suggesting that this trait may have strong 
links with individuals’ perceptions of personal control.  In other words, students high in 
achievement-striving had greater belief in their abilities to master key aspects of 
coursework (e.g., concentrating during class, taking good notes; see Appendix 1) 
irrespective of performance feedback.  This suggests the possibility that there may be a 
link between achievement striving and mastery goal orientation (Dweck, 1986), such 
that individuals high in these qualities believe that their abilities are mutable through 
personal effort. 
Neither conscientiousness, neuroticism, nor their facets accounted for unique 




personality factor was significantly related to goals at either Time 1 or Time 2.  This 
was not consistent with earlier research showing relationships between 
conscientiousness and goal level (e.g., Barrick, Mount, & Strauss, 1993; Phillips & 
Gully, 1997).  It is possible that the null results in the present study were a function of 
range restriction in goals: 60% of the participants set a goal of 90 or greater for the next 
exam. 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
 A limitation of the present investigation concerns its generalizability to work 
contexts.  However, the advantages of using undergraduate participants and exam 
performance as the criterion in part mitigate such concerns.  Specifically, in this type of 
study, performance is exactly quantifiable and a function of individual effort (Campion 
& Lord, 1982).  This makes it possible to identify predictor/criterion relationships with 
less risk of criterion contamination than would be typical in most jobs.  Additionally, 
the basic processes stud ied here should transfer well to work contexts; abundant 
research has demonstrated the relevance of personality and motivational states to job 
performance (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Stajkovic & Luthans, 1998; Tubbs, 1986).  
However, an important next step will be to replicate study findings in organizational 
settings. 
 A secondary limitation is the lack of experimental control in the study design. 
The correlational nature of most of the hypotheses prohibits causal inferences.  
However, owing to the temporal stability of personality (Costa & McCrae, 1997) 
relative to situationally specific self-efficacy and goals, it is likely that personality may 
impact motivational processes, and not vice versa. 
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A review of the results (Table 6) shows that many hypotheses were not 
supported.  This might lead the reader to conclude that the overall findings of this 
investigation were negative.  However, it should be noted that several of these 
hypotheses were exploratory in nature, lacking much previous empirical or theoretical 
support; for example, there has been virtually no published research on the differential 
predictive validity of the facets of neuroticism.  At this stage in personality and 
motivation research, the investigator must often be guided more by conceptual factors 
than by empirical data.  Additionally, in the present study, whereas personality was 
examined at two levels of analysis (facet and global), the criterion variable, task 
performance, was only operationalized at a single level.  As discussed above, the 
criterion-related validities tended to be higher for the facets than for the global 
constructs.  However, if the criterion were operationalized at a higher level of generality 
(e.g., as an overall performance construct including attendance, punctuality, course 
grade, and grades in other classes), it is possible that the relationships would have been 
stronger for the global than the facet measures.  By the same token, the predictive 
validities for the facet measures may have been enhanced if the criterion were parsed 
into more molecular tasks (e.g., homework scores, class participation, individual test 
items, or weekly quizzes).  In other words, the finding that facets outpredicted global 
measures may have been attributable to a greater match in bandwidth or specificity 
between these predictors and the criterion (Cronbach & Gleser, 1957).   
Further research is needed to advance several of the findings reported in the 
present investigation.  First, the effects of the remaining Big Five factors (extraversion, 
agreeableness, and openness to experience) and their facets on motivation and 
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performance remain to be explored.  Although previous research indicates that these are 
less reliably related to performance than conscientiousness and neuroticism (Barrick & 
Mount, 1991), very little research has been conducted concerning the facets of these 
constructs.  For example, some of the openness facets (e.g., ideas) might be related to 
task performance whereas others (e.g., fantasy) might tend to be unrelated to 
performance.  Combining these facets into a global personality dimension may mask the 
criterion-related validity of the factor construct. 
 A second avenue for future research concerns interactions among personality 
traits at both global and facet levels.  For instance, Witt, Burke, Barrick, and Mount 
(2002) recently showed that conscientiousness and agreeableness interacted to predict 
job performance ratings, such that workers high in both received higher ratings than 
workers high in conscientiousness alone.  In view of the fact that anxiety was positively 
related to performance in the present study, it would be interesting to determine whether 
anxiety moderates the relationship between achievement-striving and performance, such 
that individuals high on both outperform individuals high on one or the other. 
 Finally, the results of the present study need to be replicated using different  
samples and measures.  One natural candidate for the latter would be the Hogan 
Personality Inventory (HPI; Hogan & Hogan, 1995), a personality questionnaire that 
has seen extensive testing in industrial settings.  It would also be useful to determine the 
extent to which the present findings generalize to actual work populations.  The most 




 The importance of this line of research to organizations should be mentioned.  
Because personality testing is increasingly used by organizations as part of their 
selection processes (Hough, 2001) it is important for researchers to get a better 
understanding of which personality variables are best predictors of performance.  
Knowing, for example, that achievement-striving is a stronger predictor than 
deliberation of performance can cue personnel managers to weight applicants’ scores on 
achievement more highly than on deliberation.  There are also implications for 
performance management: Understanding the different sensitivity to self-efficacy 
beliefs and goals associated with different personality types might be useful to 
managers seeking to enhance productivity through performance appraisal or training. 
Conclusion 
 Results of this investigation shed new light on the relationships between 
personality, motivation, and performance.  Theoretical propositions tested with 
structural equation modeling  suggested that personality factors not only predict 
important motivational processes (i.e., self-efficacy), but also account for unique 
variance in performance when the effects of such processes are controlled.  
Additionally, this study has supplemented earlier research work demonstrating the 
added criterion-related validity associated with facet-level personality measurement for 
both motivational processes and performance.  Generally, the criterion-related validities 
were higher for conscientiousness and its facets than for neuroticism and its facets.  
Finally, changes in self-efficacy were shown to be marginally related to 
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APPENDIX A: GOAL AND SELF-EFFICACY QUESTIONNAIRE 
Name________________ 
ID#_________________ 
What is the minimum (the least you would be satisfied with) percentage grade goal for 
the next test (on a scale of 0% to 100%)?___________ 
  
Please circle the number that corresponds to your level of agreement. 
 
I am confident in my ability to concentrate and stay fully focused on the materials being 
presented throughout each class period. 
                
 Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree 
                
I am confident in my ability to memorize and recall on demand the facts and concepts 
covered in this course. 
        
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree 
  
I am confident in my ability to focus exclusively on understanding and answering 
questions and avoiding breaks in my concentration during exams. 
          
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree 
 
I understand the facts, concepts and arguments covered in the course as they are 
presented in lectures and the textbook. 
          
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree 
 
I am confident in my ability to explain the facts, concepts, and arguments covered in the 
course clearly to others in my own words.  
          
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree 
 
I am able to discriminate between the more important and less important facts, 
concepts, and arguments covered in the course. 
       
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree 
 
I am able to make understandable course notes which emphasize, clarify, and relate key 
facts, concepts, and arguments as they are presented in lectures and the text. 
         






APPENDIX B: CONSENT FORM 
 
Participation in the Goal-Setting Investigation 
 
1.)   Overview: Participants in this study will be asked to set goals and rate their own ability 
on several dimensions of academically-related behaviors (e.g., ability to concentrate in class).  
Additionally, they will complete a personality inventory and a cognitive ability test.  The 
purpose of the study is to improve our understanding of the role individual differences play in 
determining motivational behaviors and performance. 
 
2.)  Goal questionnaires will be administered on two occasions.  The first administration 
will occur the class meeting before Exam 1 (Sept 19).  The second administration will occur 
two class meetings after Exam 1 (Sept 26).   
 
3.)  Separate 1-hour sessions will be held for the administration of the other two 
questionnaires.  These will occur at various times (TBA) during the semester.   
 
4.)  You must complete all the above questionnaires and take both Exams 1 and 2 to 
receive any credit for this study. You will receive a total of 6 extra credit points (out of 16 
maximum) for participating in this study. 
 
5.)  The extra credit points you accumulate for participating in this study can only be 
applied toward your grade in this class. 
 
6.)  In order to match your responses on the goal-setting questionnaires to personality and 
cognitive ability questionnaires, I need to be able to identify you individually.  For this purpose, 
you must place your Student ID Number on the first page of each goal-setting, personality, 
and cognitive ability questionnaire.  To guarantee your anonymity and the confidentiality of 
your responses, this identifying information will be removed from the questionnaires after all 
the data have been collected.  Furthermore, at no time during the semester will the data be 
examined or analyzed; your responses will only be entered into a data file for future analysis.  
Thus, you can feel confident that I will in no way know how you responded to any of the 
questionnaires, so you should feel comfortable answering them openly and honestly.  
 
7.)  Because this is a goal-setting study, it is important to know how individuals actually 
perform.  Therefore, the relationship between your exam scores and your responses on the goal-
setting, personality, and cognitive ability questionnaires will be examined.  However, this will 
not be done until after the semester is over.  At that time, they will be matched by ID numbers.  
Once all data are accounted for, and extra credit points assigned, all identifying information for 
the questionnaires will be discarded. 
 
8.)   Finally, you are free to withdraw from the study at any point during the semester 
without penalty.  You have the option of participating in other research being offered by the 
Psychology Department, or of completing the written assignments for extra credit.  If at any 
point in the semester you wish to discuss the nature of the study with me, feel free to contact 
me.   
 
I have read the above information and agree to participate in the Goal-Setting Research Study. 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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